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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
I. ELECTIONS IN LIMITED PURPOSE DISTRICTS: THE 
CONTINUING VITALITY OF SAL YER LAND 
COMPANY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In James v. BallI the Ninth Circuit found unconstitutional 
certain Arizona statutes which mandated that voting in elections 
for directors of the Salt River Project Agricultural and Improve-
ment and Power District (the District) was limited to landown-
ers, with votes apportioned according to owned acreage.2 James 
focused on an interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,3 
and may be viewed as narrowing the scope of that decision. 
Under the Reclamation Act of 1902,4 the federal govern-
ment and the State of Arizona formed a joint project in the Salt 
River Valley for the storage and distribution of water. The Salt 
River Valley Waters Users' Association (the Association) was 
created to finance the construction of project facilities. Only 
landowners within the District could belong to the Association. 
The obligations of the Association were tr~smuted in prorata 
liens on the lands of Association members. The District was 
formed in 1937 when the costs of financing project facilities be-
came overly burdensome for the Association. In exchange for ti-
tle to project facilities, the District agreed to provide whatever 
capital and operating funds the Association needed to operate 
project facilities. Pursuant to the agreement, the District also 
agreed to operate project water storage and distribution facili-
ties. In order to generate revenue to offset the costs of providing 
water, the District produces electricity and today is Arizona's 
1. 613 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Choy, the other panel members were Kennedy, 
J., and Hall, D.J., sitting by designation, dissenting). 
2. [d. at 181. 
3. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See notes 27-42 infra and accompanying text. 
4. Act of June 17,1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-
1457 (1976». 
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second largest utility. 
The District is divided into ten electoral subdivisions. Each 
subdivision elects one director and three council members. The 
president and vice-president of the district are elected at-large. 
Qualified electors may vote for these offices according to the 
amount of land they own in the District. Two at-large directors 
are elected in addition to the other directors and officers. II The 
twelve-member Board of Directors and the thirty-member 
Council administer the District. 
B. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
The Constitution does not specifically guarantee the right to 
vote in state elections, but the Supreme Court has held that 
once a state grants that right, all infringements upon it must be 
subjected to the requirements of the equal protection clause.6 In 
Gray v. Sanders,? the Supreme Court held that one person's vot-
ing power could not be greater than that of another in a state-
wide legislative election merely because of the location of his 
residence. In Wesberry v. Sanders,s the Supreme Court recog-
nized for the first time that the Constitution protects the right 
to vote. In the seminal decision of Reynolds v. Sims,9 the Court 
held that a person's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired 
when the weight of the citizen's vote is made to depend on 
where he lives. The "one person-one vote" standard has its roots 
in the Court's statement in Reynolds that "the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith ef-
fort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislatures, as 
nearly of equal population as is practicable."lo Since Reynolds, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked and enlarged the one 
person-one vote principle. 
5. 613 F.2d at 239. This number became four in 1980. These at-large directors are 
elected on a per-person voting basis rather than having the votes apportioned according 
to owned acreage. 
6. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1965). See generally 25 
AM. JUR. 2d Elections §§ 53·57 (1966). . 
7. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
8. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
10. ld. at 536. The "one person-one vote" terminology arose in Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. at 381. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 1511 was the first 
case to require the invocation of strict scrutiny when examining 
infringement on the voting franchise. Kramer involved a chal-
lenge to a section of the New York Education Codel2 which pro-
vided that voters, otherwise qualified to vote in state and federal 
elections, could not vote in certain school district elections un-
less they (1) owned or leased taxable real property within the 
district, or (2) were parents or guardians of children enrolled in 
the local public schools. Plaintiff was denied his application to 
vote because he did not own or Jease any property within the 
district and had no children. 
In finding the statute unconstitutional~ the Kramer Court 
recognized the fundamental nature of the right to vote, any im-
pairment of which must be "carefully and meticulously scruti-
nized."13 Thus, any state statute that grants the right to vote to 
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and de-
nies it to others must be examined to determine whether the 
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.14 
Moreover, the need for strict scrutiny is not affected because the 
district meetings and the school board do not have general legis-
lative powers. lIS Strict scrutiny is "not necessitated by the sub-
ject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident 
citizens are permitted to participate and some are not."IB 
The school district asserted that there was a compelling 
state interest in restricting the franchise to those members of 
the community" 'primarily interested in such elections.' "l7 The 
Court, however, bypassed this issue and went directly to the sec-
ond half of the equal protection inquiry- whether the statute 
was necessary to promote the assertedly compelling state inter-
est.IS The Court ultimately determined that because the law per-
mitted the inclusion of many persons having only a "remote and 
11. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
12. N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 2012 (McKinney). 
13. 395 U.S. at 626 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562). 
14. ld. at 627 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965». 
15. ld. at 629. 
16. ld. (emphasis added). 
17. ld. at 631 (quoting Brief for Appellee). 
18. See id. at 632 n.14. The court stated that if it found the exclusions necessary to 
promote the articulated state interest, it would then have to determine whether the in-
terest promoted by limiting the franchise was a compelling state interest. 
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indirect interest in school affiars" while disenfranchising others 
having a "distinct and direct interest in ... school meeting de-
cisions,"19 the section was not sufficiently tailored to limiting the 
vote to those "primarily interested" in school affairs to justify 
the denial of the franchise to plaintiff.20 
The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny in' several 
challenges to limitations of. the right to vote.21 In Cipriano v. 
City of Houma,22 the Court held that a statute which provided 
that a municipal utility could issue revenue bonds only upon ap-
proval of a majority of the voters in an election in which only 
qualified property taxpayers were permitted to vote, violated the 
equal protection clause. In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,28 the Court 
relied upon Cipriano iJrl invalidating property ownership require-
ments in elections approving issuance of general obligation 
bonds. In Hill v. Stone,2f. the Court found that provisions of the 
state constitution, state election code, and city charter which 
limited the right to vote in city bond elections to those persons 
having "rendered" property (listed with the tax assessor-collec-
tor either real, mixed, or personal property for taxation in the 
election district)25 fell far short of meeting the compelling state 
interest test consistently applied in Kramer, Cipriano, and 
Phoenix.26 
Recently, in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District2'1 anel Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,26 
the Supreme Court carved out two exceptions to the rule that 
strict scrutiny should be applied when examining limitations 
19. [d. at 632. 
20. [d. at 633. The Court rejected the School District's argument that the legislature 
was the proper body to balance the interest of the community in the maintenance of 
orderly school district elections against the interest of the individual in voting in such 
elections. 
21. See, e.g., Hill v. Stolle, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 
204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
22. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
23. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). 
24. 421 U.S. 289 (1975). 
25. [d. at 291 n.l. Under the statutes rendering even a very small amount of prop-
erty qualified the person to "ote. [d. at 299. 
26. [d. at 301. 
27. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Im-
provement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (decided the same day as Salyer). 
28. 439 U.S. 60 (1978). 
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upon the fundamental right to vote. Salyer resolved the ques-
tion left open to Kramer-whether states could limit voting to 
those primarily interested in an election.29 Defendant Tulare 
Water District (the TWD) in Salyer was created for the acquisi-
tion, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distri-
bution of water for the ultimate benefit of farm land within the 
District.30 The TWD was governed by a board of directors. Only 
landowners could vote in elections for the board and votes were 
apportioned according to the assessed valuation of their land. 
The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist determined that, 
because the TWD had a special limited purpose and due to the 
disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, 
the TWD fell within an exception to the one person-one vote 
principle of Reynolds.31 Justice Rehnquist relied on Avery v. 
Midland CountyS2 which had intimated that a state could elect 
certain functionaries who perform duties so far removed from 
normal governmental activities and affecting certain groups so 
disproportionately that the one person-one vote principle need 
not apply.3s 
In Holt, defendant City of Tuscaloosa had extended the ex-
ercise of its municipal powers over citizens of surrounding com-
munities including those of the City of Holt. State statutes al-
lowed the city to exercise police and sanitary regulations, 
criminal jurisdiction of the city's court and the power to license 
businesses, trades and professions, all within a three-mile radius 
of the city limits. Plaintiff Holt Civil Club alleged a denial of 
due process and equal protection because citizens of Holt were 
not allowed to vote in Tuscaloosa municipal elections. 
In the opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to 
apply strict scrutiny and distinguished the Kramer-Cipriano-
Phoenix line of .cases. Justice Rehnquist insisted that the hold-
ings in those cases were predicated upon denial of the right to 
29. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. IS, 395 U.S. at 631. 
30. 410 U.S. at 723. 
31. Id. at 728. 
32. 390 U.S. 477 (1968). 
33. 397 U.S. at 56. Justice Rehnquist failed to reconcile this conclusion with the 
language in Kramer that an entity's lack of general governmental powers did not affect 
the need for "close judicial examination." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. IS, 395 
U.S. at 629. 
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vote to individuals "physically resident within the geographic 
boundaries of the governmental entity concerned."s4 Since Tus-
caloosa denied the franchise only to those living outside. its cor-
porate limits, a mere rational basis scrutinty was required.slI In-
deed, the Court's inquiry was limited to the question of whether 
"any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the 
statute.ss This standard was easily met by finding that the state 
legislature could have determined that cities need a certain de-
gree of control over activities just beyond their borders.S7 More-
over, the legislature could legitimately determine that munici-
palities should have some control over activities conducted 
within their police jurisdiction.ss 
Both Salyer and Holt ignored traditional equal protection 
analysis. Normally, strict scrutiny is triggered when either a fun-
damental right or a suspect classification is involved.s9 Strict 
scrutiny requires that the statutory classification be necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest.40 Thus, as in Kramer, strict 
scrutiny should first be applied because of the fundamental na-
ture of the right to vote. Then the interests of the otherwise 
qualified, but excluded, voters must be examined to determine if 
the statutory disenfranchisement is necessary to advance a com-
pelling state interest. Salyer and Holt reversed the analysis. 
These cases initially examined the interest of the excluded vot-
ers to determine if strict scrutiny applied in the first instance. In 
both opinions, Justice Rehnquist concluded that mere rational 
basis scrutiny was appropriate.41 
34. 439 u.s. at 68. 
35. [d. at 74. 
36. [d. (emphasis added) (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. at 732). By embracing the "any conceivable basis" test Justice 
Rehnquist reversed the modem trend of the Supreme Court by reverting to the ex-
tremely deferential standard of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 
(1911). Recent cases applying rational basis scrutiny have demanded a more exacting 
standard and have refused to manufacture imaginative justifications for the asserted 
state interest. Ct. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973) (requiring that the chal-
lenged distinction rationally further some legitimate, articulated state purpose). See 
generally Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
37. 439 U.S. at 74. 
38. [d. 
39. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634. 
41. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. at 70; Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. at 728-30. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/6
1981] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87 
Salyer and Holt may be viewed as narrow exceptions to the 
principles established in the Kramer-Cipriano-Phoenix line of 
cases. Nonetheless, at least one commentator perceives them as 
a shift in the Court's position on equal protection.42 
C. THE James v. Ball ANALYSIS 
In James the Ninth Circuit attempted to determine the cor-
rect interpretation of Salyer. Ostensibly for a proper explication 
of the rationale behind its James decision, the majority under-
took a dissection of Salyer. The majority noted first that the 
sole means of meeting the expenses of the Tulare Water District 
was through assessments against landowners; thus landowners as 
a class bore the entire financial burden. Second, the TWD ex-
isted solely in order to procure water for farming the agricultural 
lands of the district. Third, while the TWD had power to engage 
in flood control activities, "the Court found these powers were 
incident to the exercise of its primary functions of water storage 
and distribution." Finally, the TWD did not provide those ser-
vices typical of other general public services "such as schools, 
housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the 
type ordinarily financed by a municipal body."43 
The situation in James is very different from that in Salyer. 
The majority reasoned that although the Salt River District 
once bore some similarities to the district in Salyer, the present 
reach and effect of the District's operations upon all of the re-
sidents of Arizona were far more extensive than those of the 
TWD in Salyer.44 For example, the District is the second largest 
utility in Arizona, servicing nearly a quarter of a million persons, 
with many and diverse activities. In addition, the majority found 
that the water operations of the District were significantly more 
diverse than those in Salyer.4fS The District provides water to 
42. Note, Voting Rights and Extraterritorial Municipal Powers in Light of Holt 
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1085 (1979). But see L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAw 765 (1978) ("Salyer • •• should be treated as a narrowly lim-
ited exception to a powerful general principle that interest-based restrictions are consti-
tutionally disfavored. "). 
43. 613 F.2d at 183 (citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist., 440 U.S. at 728-29). 
44. Id. Thus at some point along the continuum between the factual setting of 
James and that of Salyer the constitutional prerequisites of the one person-one vote 
principle of Reynolds is no longer applicable. 
45. Id. 
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major portions of Phoenix, twenty-five percent of its total capac-
ity going to municipal uses and an additional fifteen percent for 
nonagricultural uses. ,]~he inexorable consequence of the diver-
sity of the District was the conclusion by the majority that the 
District could not be -characterized as having a special limited 
purpose such as in Salyer.46 
Addressing the other half of the Salyer test-whether the 
District's activities disproportionately affected landowners-the 
majority concluded that they did not.47 Almost forty percent of 
the District's water is purchased and consumed in a manner un-
related to agriculture and land ownership. Ninety-eight percent 
of the District's revenues are produced by its electric utility op-
erations.48 The District in James is therefore fundamentally dif-
ferent from the TWD in Salyer, the majority reasoned, because 
"the financial burden of operating the District does not fall en-
tirely or even primarily on landowners; it falls instead on the 
purchasers of electricity."49 
In his dissent, District Judge Peirson M. Hall attacked the 
majority's conclusions as to the special limited purpose of the 
District, and its disproportionate affect upon landowners. Ini-
tially, however, Judge Hall concluded that only the first half of 
the Salyer test-the performance of traditional general govern-
mental functions-was necessary to finding that the Salyer ex-
ception applies.150 This conclusion stemmed from language in 
Hadley v. Junior College District,151 upon which Salyer relied, 
stating in the conjunctive that the possession of vital and tradi-
tional governmental powers which had an effect throughout the 
district as well as disproportionate effect upon different groups, 
appeared to be prerequisites to the application of strict equal 
protection requiremellts, not to the availability of an exception 
46. Id. at 183-84. 
47. Id. at 184. The majority quoted dictum from Cipriano noting that the opera-
tions of gas, water, and electric utility 8ystems affect virtually every citizen of a city. 395 
U.S. at 705. It would therefore be doubtful that any established utility could fall within 
the Salyer exception because one of Salyer'S requirements is a small effect upon the 
general electorate. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728-30. 
48. 613 F.2d at 184. 
49. [d. (emphasis added). 
50. [d. at 190. 
51. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
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from them. 52 
The dissent reasoned that the District does not perform 
traditional general governmental functions because the Arizona 
legislature has defined the District's purpose as "securing water 
necessary to improve agricultural land."lIs Moreover, the Dis-
trict's powers are incidental to its primary purpose of water con-
trol. M Such a limited role as this does not demonstrate an exer-
cise of general governmental powers.511 Indeed the dissent would 
52. ld. at 53-54, 56. 
53. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-903 that provides: 
A. When five or more holders of title or evidence of title 
to agricultural lands which have at any time been recognized 
as within the exterior boundaries of a United States reclama-
tion project and which are susceptible of irrigation by the 
same general system of irrigation works, desire to provide for 
the improvement of such lands, they may propose the organi-
zation of an agricultural improvement district under the provi-
sions of this chapter for any of the following purposes: 
1. To secure all or a portion of the water necessary to irri-
gate the lands, or any part thereof, or to increase or secure 
additional water therefor. 
2. To provide for the storage, regulation, control or distri-
bution of all or any part of the water already available or for 
an additional or increased water supply available or to become 
available for the irrigation of all or a portion of the lands. 
3. To provide for the development of additional water for 
the irrigation of all or a portion of the lands. 
4. To provide for the drainage of all or a part of the lands. 
5. To increase, enlarge or extend, operate and maintain 
any irrigation or drainage works already in existence and 
available for the irrigation or drainage of all or a part of the 
lands. 
6. To provide new or additional means for the irrigation 
or drainage of all or a part of the lands or to provide power or 
a means of communication for the use of the owners or occu-
pants of the lands. 
7. To reduce the cost of irrigation, drainage and power to 
the owners of the lands in the district by the sale of surplus 
water or power produced, owned or controlled by the district, 
and the construction, maintenance, extension, replacement, 
financing and refinancing of the works useful for such purpose. 
8. To finance or refinance as its own obligation all or a 
part of a debt incurred or proposed to be incurred by a public 
or private agency in the construction, maintenance, improve-
ment or replacement of the structures and equipment neces-
sary or useful for the accomplishment of any of the purposes 
set forth in this section. 
54. 613 F.2d at 190. 
55.ld. 
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regard the authority to develop and sell electrical power as pre-
empted by the more basic need for water. liS 
The majority addressed the dissent's concern by noting that 
the District is not a private company, so the District should not 
be compared with a private company where only sharehold-
ers-here, landowners-may vote. On the contrary, the District 
is a public entity, being a political subdivision of the State of 
Arizona with the legal status of a municipality.1I7 In addition, the 
level of the District operations "simply does not permit the in-
terpretation that the electric utility is a side venture that the 
District dabbles in to pick up a little extra money in order to 
benefit the landowners. "118 Moreover, the majority stated that 
the District's electrical operations had taken on independent sig-
nificance, and it would "elevate form over substance to charac-
terize the District as functioning solely for the benefit of 
landowners."lIs 
The dissent next asserted that, although certain municipali-
ties provide water and electrical services, these functions are not 
traditionally governmental services.so In Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Company,61 the Supreme Court stated that supply-
ing utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of 
the state and is not traditionally associated with sovereignty.8s 
The dissent insisted that even if the District is compared to vital 
governmental services, it is not a utility. The District is not 
owned by the public, but by private landowners. Since the 
"profits from the salo of electricity are used to defray the ex-
pense in irrigating th.ese private lands for personal profit" the 
dissent asserted that the District did not function to " 'serve the 
whole people' but rather operates for the benefit of these 'inhab-
itants of the district' who are private owners."ss Therefore, the 
Salyer exception should apply, and not the one person-one vote 
56. [d. at 186. 
57. [d. at 184. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 190. 
61. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 
854 n.18 (1976). 
62. 419 U.S. at 353. 
63. 613 F.2d at 190 (quoting Local 266 v. Salt River Project Agricultural and Im-
provement Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 44, 275 P.2d 393, 403 (1954». 
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standard of Reynolds. 
The James majority successfully rebutted Judge Hall's ra-
tionale. It pointed out that the issue in James is altogether dif-
ferent from the issue in Jackson.64 Jackson involved a determi-
nation of whether the actions of a private utility were so closely 
regulated by the state that its actions could fairly be treated as 
that of the state itself. The Salyer court assumed state action 
and went on to deal directly with the issue of whether the re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment were applicable. In 
James, the majority framed the issue as "not whether the Salt 
River District is a state entity, but whether, having made the 
decision to create the entity and provide for the election of its 
directors, the state can deny the electoral franchise to citizens 
whose economic interest and natural environment are vitally af-
fected by the entity's operations. "86 
The majority further asserted that in a factual setting simi-
lar to James or Salyer, the Salyer opinion suggests an electric 
utility is governmental in nature.88 The Supreme Court found 
support for its conclusion that the Tulare District did not per-
form general governmental functions from the facts that the dis-
trict there did not provide" 'other general public services such 
as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything 
else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.' "8'1 The 
James majority reinforced this theory with the Court's opinion 
in Cipriano where a municipal utility serviced so large a per-
centage of the people in the city that the Court refused to limit 
elections called to approve the issuance of bonds by the utility 
to landowners.68 The James majority concluded that the Dis-
trict's electrical operations are so substantial in scope and so 
closely interwoven with the water delivery functions of the Dis-
trict that the special limited purpose exception of Salyer did 
not apply.69 
64. 613 F.2d at 184. 
65. ld. at 184·85. 
66. ld. at 125. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
67. ld. (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
at 728-29). 
68. 613 F.2d at 185. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
69. 613 F.2d at 185. 
11
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The dissent attempted to strengthen its conclusion that the 
Salyer exception applied through an examination of the dispro-
portionate impact of the District's activities upon District land-
owners. It asserted that both the legislative purpose and practi-
cal effect of the District's activities disproportionately concern 
the landowners.'70 This effect happens in two ways. First, the sale 
of electrical power to pl3rsons outside the District in essence sub-
sidizes the water delivery functions of the District. If the profit 
from the electric power sales is viewed as income to the District 
landowners, the District's purpose to benefit landowners is high-
lighted.'71 Second, financial reverses of the District fall dispro-
portionately upon landowners. Arizona Revised Statute section 
45-1047(A) provides that District bonds may create liens upon 
the real property within the District.'72 Moreover, state law pro-
vides for raising District revenue by taxation of District land-
owners. '73 Accordingly, the dissent found that the liabilities of 
the District fall disproportionately upon District landowners.'74 
The majority attacked the legal assumption that "dispro-
portionate representation may be used to prevent electors who 
have a direct and substantial interest in a government entity's 
70. Id. at 190. 
n. Id. at 191. 
72. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-1047(A) provides iD full: 
All bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be 
a lien upon the real property included in the district, and such 
bonds and the interest thereon shall be payable from the levy 
of taxes upon the real property included in the district. All the 
real property in the district shall be and remain liable to taxa-
tion for such payments, but whenever any such bonds are ad-
ditionally secured by.a pledge of the income, revenue and re-
ceipts of the district as provided in this chapter, the board 
shall abate and lovy of any tax herein required for the current 
year in which the income, revenue and receipts to be received 
by the district, or on hand for that purpose, will be sufficient 
to make the principal and interest payments due upon such 
bonds. 
73. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-1014(B) provides in full: 
B. The board of supervisors shall levy against such landowner 
in the district a tax equal to the unit rate multiplied by the 
number of acres owned, and certified by the board of directors 
of the district to the board of supervisors. The board of direc-
tors, in certifying the annual estimate to the board of supervi-
sors, shall include a list of landowners in the district and the 
number of acres owned by each. 
74. 613 F.2d 191. 
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operations from out-voting certain other electors who own land 
that constitutes part of the security for the entity's financial 
structure. "'15 The majority stated that there is no legal support 
for the implicit rationale that disproportionate. electoral repre-
sentation may serve as a safety device to protect the property 
interests or expectations of landowners.'16 The Salyer exception 
applies for an altogether different reason; "under conditions, of 
most narrow dimension, there may exist a state-created entity, 
limited to operations with little effect on' the general electorate 
and a substantially disproportionate effect on the interests of a 
discrete group permitted to vote."'1'1 If, as in James, the opera-
tions of a state entity affect a diverse group of citizens, the right 
to vote may not exclude those who have an interest in the 
election. '18 
D. CONCLUSION 
The courts have two options in cases where the issue is ap-
plication of the special limited purpose exception of Salyer. On 
the one hand, a court may perform a straightforward analysis 
based upon the factors enumerated in Salyer-possession of 
general governmental powers and disproportionate affect upon a 
discrete group. If these factors are found to exist, the court may 
find that the application of the Salyer doctrine is appropriate. 
On the other hand, the court may pay lip service to the in-
herently unsound rationale of Salyer by articulating the Salyer 
factors. Once it is found that the Salyer exception does not ap-
ply, the court should reach the more substantial equal protec-
tion issues posed by Kramer and its progeny. Only if the statu-
tory scheme is found to be' necessary to effectuating a 
compelling state interest must it be held constitutional. 
. In light of the fluctuating state of equal protection analysis 
being performed by the Supreme Court in voting rights cases, it 
is difficult to predict the outcome of any particular case. The 
75. [d. at 185. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. (citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
at 728-30). The language chosen by the Ninth Circuit limiting the Salyer exception to 
conditions "of most narrow dimension" indicates the court's desire to give Salyer a very 
restricted interpretation, if not to limit it to its facts. 
78. 613 F.2d at 242. 
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latter approach articulated above offers lower courts the flex-
ibility required to satisfy the competing interests of (1) adher-
ence to Supreme Court precedent, and (2) performing a strict 
equal protection analysilJ when faced with infringement of a fun-
damental right. 
The James court lJatisfied the duty of adherence to Su-
preme Court precedent by choosing to decide the case through a 
straightforward analysis of Salyer. The ultimate result in James 
appears to be correct because under an application of strict scru-
tiny it is doubtful that the statutory scheme would be found 
necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest. In conso-
nance with the close jud.icial examination warranted when exam-
ining infringements upon a fundamental right, however, a better 
approach would have been to reach the same result as the James 
court did by first finding Salyer inapplicable and then perform-
ing a strict equal protection analysis. 
Brian Beverly* 
II. EQUAL PROTEC'rION - "STACKED DECK" AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School District,l the Ninth Circuit upheld a challenge to a 
San Francisco Board -of Education's affirmative action policy, 
thus prohibiting the San Francisco Unified School District 
(School District) from ,engaging in a voluntary affirmative action 
program with respect to the hiring of school district construction 
contractors. 
Under the policy, bidders for School District construction 
jobs were required to be either minority general contractors or 
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 616 F.2d 1381 (9th eir. 1980), rehearing denied, Feb. 22 and April 25, 1980 (per 
Choy, C. J.; the other panel members were Hug, J. and Richey, D. J., sitting by 
designation). 
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to employ minority subcontractors for twenty-five percent in 
dollar volume of the contracted work.2 Noncomplying bidders 
were declared not "responsible bidders"3 under California Edu-
cation Code section 39640," which requires the school districts to 
award construction contracts to the "lowest responsible bid-
der."6 Associated General Contractors, Inc. challenged the policy 
and the district court enjoined the School District from enforc-
ing it, "on the ground that 'responsibility' under the state law 
referred only to a building contractor's financial and physical 
ability to do the work."s 
At approximately the same time as the district court issued 
an injunction the School District was awarded eight million dol-
lars in public works funds under the Public Works Employment 
Act of 19777 (PWEA). Section 6705(f)(2) of the PWEA requires 
an applicant to give "satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that 
at least ten per centum of the amount of each grant shall be 
expended for 'minority business enterprises.'''8 Subsequently, 
the Board enacted another policy substantially similar to the 
first. The second policy provided for twenty-five percent ex-
penditures on minority contractors instead of the ten percent re-
quired by the PWEA and applied only to projects financed by 
2. 616 F.2d at 1381. 
3.ld. 
4. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39640 (West 1978) (formerly CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15951). 
5.ld. 
6. 616 F.2d at 1383. The district court also prohibited the School District from 
awarding contracts to other than the lowest responsible bidder merely because the lower 
bidder was of the wrong parentage and refused to accede to the School District's views 
on socially desirable subcontracting. Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco 
Unified School Dist., 431 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (Supp. I 1977). 
8. ld. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(£)(2) provides: 
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, 
no grant shall be made under this chapter for any local public 
works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance 
to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of 
each grant shall be expended for minority business enter-
prises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority 
business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per centum 
of which is owned' by minority group members or, in case of a 
publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of 
which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes 
of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citi-
zens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, 
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 
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the PWEA. Associated General Contractors, Inc. then applied 
for a contempt order to vindicate the earlier injunction. The dis-
trict court dismissed the proceeding but issued an order reduc-
ing the twenty-five percent quota under the policy to the ten 
percent minimum required under the PWEA and modified its 
previous injunction so as not to prohibit the new policy~ 9 
B. THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit considered four major arguments before 
deciding that the affirmative action policy was impermissible 
under the law of California. First, the court determined that the 
authority of the Board was derived from California Education 
Code section 3516010 which limits the authority of the school 
board by prohibiting conflicts with other state laws.l1 The court 
found that California's "low bid law" for school district con-
tracts, California Education Code section 39640,12 conflicted 
with the Board's affirmative action policy.lS Therefore, the pol-
icy was found not to be within the authority of the Board.I " Sec-
ond, apparently creating new· terminology, the court labelled 
quota and "positive-factor" type affirmative action programs 
"stacked deck" programs.lI~ The court found there was no affirm-
ative constitutional duty to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative 
action.16 Third, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no affirm-
ative duty under the California Constitution to engage in 
"stacked deck" affirmative action programs.17 Fourth, the court 
decided that even though the California low bid law prohibited 
the affirmative action policy, it was not unconstitutional as 
applied.ls 
C. THE STATE LAW CONFLICT 
The San Francisco School District drew its authority from 
9. 616 F.2d at 1383. 
10. [d. at 1384. For the full text of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160 (West 1978) see note 19 
infra. 
11. 616 F.2d at 1384. 
12. For the full text of C}.L. EDUC. CODE § 39640, see note 21 infra. 
13. 616 F.2d at 1385. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. at 1386. See text accompanying notes 29-35 infra. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. at 1388. 
18. [d. at 1390-91. 
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California Education Code section 35160 which provides that 
"the governing board of any school district may initiate and 
carry on any program. . . which is not in conflict with or incon-
sistent with ... any laW."19 This is a broad, but limited, grant 
of power to school districts to engage in appropriate activities. 
The Ninth Circuit found a basic conflict between the policy 
adopted by the Board and section 39640,20 which states "[t]he 
governing board of any school district shall let any contract. • . 
to the lowest responsible bidder who shall give such security as 
the board requires, or else reject all bids."21 
Relying primarily upon Inglewood-Los Angeles County 
Civic Center Authority v. Superior Court,22 the Ninth Circuit 
found that the power conferred by section 35160 was inconsis-
tent with state court interpretations of California low bid law.28 
Inglewood involved a contract for construction of the City of 
Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center. Under California 
Government Code section 25454,24 the contract was to be 
awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder." Insofar as it re-
quires contracts to be awarded to the "lowest responsible bid-
der," section 25454 is similar to section 39640. The Inglewood 
19. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 35160 (West 1978). Section 35160 states in full: 
On and after January I, 1976, the governing board of any 
school district may initiate and carry on any program, activity, 
or may otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict 
with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and which 
is not in conflict with the purposes for which school districts 
are established. 
20. 616 F.2d at 1385. 
21. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 39640 (West 1978) (emphasis added). Section 39640 states in 
full: 
The governing board of any school district shall let any con-
tracts involving an expenditure of more than eight thousand 
dollars ($8,000) for work to be done or more than twelve thou-
sand dollars ($12,000) for materials or supplies to be fur-
nished, sold, or leased to the district, to the lowest responsible 
bidder who shall give such security as the board requires, or 
else reject all bids. This section applies to all material and 
supplies whether patented or otherwise. 
22. 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500 P.2d 601, 103 CaL Rptr. 689 (1972). 
23. 616 F.2d at 1385. 
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25454 (West 1968). Section 25454 states in full: "The board 
shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, and the person to whom the 
contract is awarded shall perform the work in accordance with the pIan, specifications, 
strain sheets, and working details, unless the contract is modified by a four-fifths vote of 
the board." 
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court held that the term "responsible" in section 25454 included 
the attributes of trustworthiness but it also had reference to the 
quality, fitness, and capacity of the low bidder to satisfactorily 
perform the work.25 Accordingly, a contract must be awarded to 
the lowest bidder unless it is found that he is not responsible, 
that is, "not qualified to do the particular work under 
consideration. "26 
The Ninth Circuit found that "[section] 39640 must be con~ 
strued to prohibit the Board from considering any factor other 
than the amount of the bid, the minimum qualifications of the 
bidder as to financial ability and skills to complete the job suc~ 
cessfully, and the quality of the bidder's past work."27 The result 
of the court's opinion is that section 39640 prohibits the use of 
race as a factor in determining the minimum qualifications for a 
contract bidder. Because the Board could not contract with a 
company under the policy without consideration of race, the 
court found the policy to be in conflict with the California low 
bid law and therefore beyond the authority of the Board.28 
The state low bid law is race neutral on its face. Unless the 
Ninth Circuit could find a constitutional duty requiring "stacked 
deck" affirmative action, it would fail as being in conflict with 
the state's low bid law. 
D. Is "STACKED DECK" AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REQUIRED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION? 
The Negative Potential of "Stacked Deck" Affirmative Action. 
The School District asserted that the Constitution imposed 
a legal duty to take affirmative action to remedy the effects of 
past discrimination. In order to decide whether such a duty ex~ 
isted the Ninth Circuit defined two types of affirmative action 
programs: the "reshuffle" programs and the "stacked deck" pro~ 
grams.29 The Ninth Circuit explained that "stacked deck" pro~ 
grams are so called to "connote that one contestant has been 
25. 7 Cal. 3d at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692. 
26. Id. 
27. 616 F.2d at 1385. 
28. Id. at 139!. 
29. Id. at 1386. 
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given a better-than-equal chance to win."30 In "reshufHe" pro-
grams the "state neither gives to nor withholds from anyone any 
benefits because of that person's group status, but rather en-
sures that everyone in every group enjoys the same rights in the 
same place. "31 
"Stacked deck" programs are those, according to the court, 
"in which the state specifically favors members of minorities in 
the competition with members of the majority for benefits that 
the state can give to some citizens but not to all. "32 The court 
noted no cases as examples of "stacked deck" affirmative action, 
but quota and "positive-factor" programs were characterized as 
"stacked deck" type programs.33 The Ninth Circuit stated that 
while there is an "affirmative constitutional duty to use 'reshuf-
fle' programs to cure the effects of past or present de jure segre-
gation," there is "no constitutional duty to engage in 'stacked 
deck' affirmative action."34 Other courts, however, have upheld 
the validity of "stacked deck" type programs as remedial mea-
sures to cure the present effects of past discrimination.35 
A conflict concerning such an affirmative duty exists with 
the Sixth Circuit, represented by Detroit Police Officers' Associ-
ation v. Young.3S The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent 
that the Sixth Circuit has relied on 'reshufHe' cases to find a 
constitutional duty of states to take 'stacked deck' affirmative 
action to eliminate the effects of past discrimination we disa-
gree. "37 Detroit Police concerned a voluntary affirmative action 
program initiated by the Detroit Police Department. Under that 
plan, promotions were made to the rank of sergeant from a pool 
of qualified white and black candidates. With a goal of a fifty-
fifty ratio of blacks to whites staffing at all levels the plan pro-
duced approximately one new black sergeant for each new white 
sergeant. Some white candidates with higher qualifying scores 
30. ld. at 1386 n.7. 
31. ld. at 1386. See also 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights §§ 207, 208 (1976) (defining and 
discussing reverse discrimination in employment). . 
32. 616 F.2d at 1386. 
33.ld. 
34; ld. 
35. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 91-107 (1976). 
36. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. /iled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3558 (Jan. 10, 
1980). 
37. 616 F.2d at 1386, 1387 n.9. 
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were passed over in order to achieve the fifty-fifty ratio. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the plan did not violate Title 
VI,3s Title VII39 nor section 1981,"0 but that "[t]he Constitution' 
imposes on states a duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate 
the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination."41 
However, "the Constitution not only permits but requires race-
conscious action to remedy a constitutional violation. . . ."42 
The Sixth Circuit then a.dopted the opinion of Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blac~un in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke"3 as offering "the most reasonable guidance" 
in deciding the constitutional validity of the Detroit Police De-
partment's quota-type affirmative action plan."" Detroit Police, 
is directly in conflict wi.th the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Associ-
ated General Contractors by requiring a "stacked deck" affirma-
tive action program, thereby setting the stage for a petition of 
certiorari to the Suprome Court for a final resolution of this 
question. 
In support of its conclusion that there is no constitutional 
duty to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action, the Ninth 
38. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000d - 2ooOd-6 (1976). 
39. Id. §§ 2000e - 2oooe-1'1 (1976). 
40. [d. § 1981 (1870). 
41. .608 F.2d at 692. 
42. [d. (emphasis added). 
43. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
44. 608 F.2d at 694. In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 269 (1978), Jus-
tice Brennan stated: 
[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs if 
the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial 
impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason 
to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of 
past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large. 
[d. at 369. Justice Brennan alao stated: "In addition, any statute must be stricken that 
stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the political 
process to bear the brunt of a benign program." Id. at 361. 
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144 (1977). In that case the New York Legislature, seeking to comply with the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, engaged in a reapportionment plan along racial lines which split the 
Hasidic Jewish community between two districts. The scheme took race into account, 
was intended to help nonwhites, and had the effect of disadvantaging the Hasidim. Nev-
ertheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that upon "close examination" Carey is "just another 
'reshufHe' case, because no individUal Hasid was placed in a district that violated the 
one-person-one-vote rule, and the petitioners denied that there was a right to maintain 
permanently in a single district the community's bloc voting power." 616 F.2d at 1387 
n.9. 
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Circuit asserted that "stacked deck" programs "trench" on four-
teenth amendment values.411 The court advanced four examples 
of how this may occur: (1) "stacked deck" programs offer the 
"possibility that the official discrimination is or may become in-
vidious"; (2) in "stacked deck" programs scarce benefits are uni-
laterally directed to minority individuals thereby neglecting 
others; (3) "stacked deck" programs carry short run benefits 
only for minorities and provide no collateral benefits for the ma-
jority; and (4) the "stacked deck" program "deprives citizens of 
rights. "46 
Invidious Discrimination 
The Ninth Circuit suggested that if "stacked deck" affirma-
tive· action is misused, invidious discrimination may result.4'1 
This, however, ignores the fact that affirmative action programs 
are implemented precisely in order to eliminate the effects of 
invidious discrimination. In a number of cases the Supreme 
Court has recognized the validity of quota-type affirmative 
action plans.4s In the recent case of United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber,49 the Supreme Court considered a labor 
agreement entered into by Kaiser Chemical that provided for a 
training program under which one minority worker was trained 
in a skilled craft for each non-minority worker. The Court held 
45. 616 F.2d at 1386-87. 
46. Id. at 1387. Commentators have articulated good reasons why the use of racial 
criteria should be strictly construed, and approved only where a compelling need for 
remedial action is demonstrated. For example: 
(1) Government recognition and sanction of racial classifica-
tions may be inherently divisive, re-enforcing prejudices, con-
firming perceived differences between the races, and weaken-
ing the government's educative role on behalf of equality and 
neutrality; (2) racial goals may also have unexpected results, 
such as the development of indicia for placing individuals into 
different racial categories; (3) once racial classifications are 
embedded in the law, their purpose may become perverted, 
and a benign preference under certain circumstances may 
shade into a malignant preference at other times; and (4) a 
racial preference for members of one minority may result in 
discrimination against another minority. 
15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 421 (1976). 
47. 616 F.2d at 1387. 
48. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 101 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(per Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
49. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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that the plan "fell within the area of discretion left by Title VII 
to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action 
plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories. "50 
In Davis v. County of Los Angeles51 the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized the utility of hiring quotas to eradicate the effects of 
past discrimination. In Davis, after findings by the district court 
that the Los Angeles CountY Fire Department employed blacks 
and Mexican-Americans "grossly out of proportion to their num-
ber in the population of Los Angeles County,"52 the district 
court ordered accelerated hiring of minorities "in a ratio of one 
black and one Mexican-American applicant for each three white 
applicants until the effects of past discrimination had been 
erased. "53 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that "the district 
court was wholly justified in deciding to impose affirmative hir-
ing orders"M in light of the substantial disparity between the 
percentage of minorities in the general population and minority 
firemen. 
50. [d. at 209. 
51. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977). 
52. [d. at 1337. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. at 1344. Eight courts of appeal have approved the use of accelerated hiring 
goals or quotas to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. See Boston Chapter, 
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) 
(§§ 1981 & 1983, Title VII); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 
622 (2nd Cir. 1974) (Title VII); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of Memphis, 
Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 19'14) (Title VII); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 
398 (5th Cir. 1974), modified, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Title VII); Morrow v. Chrisler, 491 
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (§ 1983); Vulcan Soc'y v. 
Civil Servo Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (§ 1983); Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Mass., Inc. V. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) 
(Title VII); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. V. Civil Servo Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 
1973) (§§ 1981, 1983); United States V. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (en 
banc) (§ 1983); Pennsylvania V. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (§ 1983); 
United States V. Local 212, 4'/2 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (Title VII); United States V. 
Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (Title 
VII); Castro V. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (§ 1983); United States V. 
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (Title 
VII); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
950 (1972) (§ 1983); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (Title VII); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. V. Secretary of 
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (Title VII); United States 
V. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (Title VII); Local 
53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VII). 
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Very recently, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional 
validity of the ten percent set aside in the PWEA in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick.1515 The Court decided that "given a reasonable con-
struction and in light of its projected administration, if we find 
the [minority business enterprise] program on its face to be free 
of constitutional defects, it must be upheld as within congres-
sional power. "156 The Court went on to find the program free of 
any constitutional defects.I5'1 
The Ninth Circuit failed to take into account that the dan-
gers of invidious discrimination in "stacked deck" programs can 
be significantly mitigated by the incorporation of administrative 
safeguards into the program designed to prevent abuse. In Fulli-
love the Supreme Court noted that the program was designed to 
ensure that PWEA grantees would not employ procurement 
practices which Congress had decided might result in the per-
petuation of the effects of prior discrimination.l5s The court rec-
ognized that these effects had "impaired or foreclosed" the 
availability of public contracting opportunities to minority busi-
nesses.159 If a "stacked deck" program is implemented with the 
goal in mind of eliminating the effects of past invidious discrimi-
nation and with proper administrative safeguards, the present 
danger of invidious discrimination is nominal. 
Unilateral Direction of Benefits 
The Ninth Circuit cautioned that a "stacked deck" program 
will be to the exclusive advantage of the minority to the conse-
quent detriment of the majority.60 The Supreme Court was 
faced with the problem of the unilateral direction of benefits to 
the minority in Fullilove. In order to uphold the ten percent set 
aside in the PWEA for minority contractors, it was necessary for 
the Gourt to find a proper justification for the quota that did not 
violate the Constitution. It reasoned that Congress had evidence 
55. 100 s. Ct. 2758 (1980). 
56. ld. at 2776 (emphasis added). 
57. ld. at 2776-80. The Court dismissed the contention that Congress must act in a 
wholly color-blind fashion, the charge that the MBE program deprived nonminority bus-
iness of access to governmentally generated contracting opportunities, and challenges 
that the MBE program was both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
58. ld. at 2775. 
59.ld. 
60. 616 F.2d at 1387. 
23
Beverly and Blystone: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
104 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:94 
of a long history of a marked disparity in the percentage of pub-
lic contracts awarded to minority businesses.61 This resulted 
from the existence and continuation of barriers to competitive 
access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimination 
and which persist today.62 Moreover, there was evidence of this 
history not only in the federal procurement arena, but with re-
spect to state and local construction contracting was well.68 
Accordingly . . . as one aspect of the equal pro-
tection of the laws . . . Congress reasonably de-
termined that the prospective elimination of these 
barriers to minority firm access to public con-
tracting opportunities generated by the 1977 Act 
was appropriate to ensure that those businesses 
were not denied equal opportunity to participate 
in federal grants to state and local governments.64 
Thus, the Supreme Court found ample justification for Congress 
to set aside ten percent for minority contractors. When the ob-
jective is remedying the present effects of past discrimination 
the program is constitutionally acceptable at least when it "is 
narrowly tailored to th<e achievement of that goal."811 
The problem which concerned the Ninth Circuit has, there-
fore, been addressed by the Supreme Court. Recognizing that 
dangers exist in every affirmative action program, the Supreme 
Court sought to demonstrate that the program must be properly 
tailored to achieve an acceptable objective. A program so 
designed disadvantages the majority only insofar as is necessary 
to accomplish the program's purpose - placing the minority in 
an equal position under the laws. 
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2767. 
62. Id. The Court noted that this lack of disparity was not considered to have re-
sulted from any lack of capable and qualified minority businesses. Id. 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 2776. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted the following addi-
tional factors relied upon by courts of appeals: 
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned dura-
tion of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percent-
age of minority group members to be employed and the per-
centage of minority group members in the relevant population 
or work force; and (iv) the availability of waiver provisions if 
the hiring plan could not be met. 
[d. at 2791 (per Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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Short Run Collateral Benefits 
As its next argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "in 
the short run, a 'stacked deck' program works wholly to the ben-
efit of certain members of one group, and correspondingly to the 
harm of certain members of another groUp.UBS On the other hand 
the court insisted that "reshufHe" programs provide some bene-
fits also to the whites, "for their exposure to the minorities is 
expected to bring understanding and wisdom."67 "Stacked deck" 
programs do not provide even collateral benefits to the 
majority.6s 
Responding to a similar contention, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that failure of nonminority firms to receive certain 
contracts is an "incidental consequence" of the program.69 
Nonetheless, "past impairment of minority-firm access to public 
contracting opportunities may have been an incidental conse-
quence of 'business-as-usual' by public contracting agencies and 
among prime contractors. "70 The Court held that the disap-
pointed expectations of nonminority firms was not a constitu-
tional defect in a limited and properly tailored program.71 
Judge Coffin's eloquent and often quoted observation in 
Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. 
Altshuler72 may be the best rejoinder to the Ninth Circuit's 
"short run" rationale: 
It is by now well understood. . . that our society 
cannot be completely color-blind in the short 
term if we are to have a color-blind society in the 
long term. After centuries of viewing through 
colored lenses, eyes do not quickly adjust when 
the lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way 
of perpetuating itself, albeit unintentionally, be-
cause the resulting inequalities make new oppor-
tunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is 
66. 616 F.2d at 1387. 
67.ld. 
68.ld: 
69. 100 S. Ct. 2758 at 2778 •. 
70.ld. 
71. ld. The Court stated that "[w]hen effectuating a limited and properly tailored 
remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination such a 'sharing of the burden' by 
innocent parties is not impermissible." ld. 
72. 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
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one partial prescription to remedy out society's 
most intransigent and deeply rooted inequal-
ities.'18 
The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that, when viewed in 
its proper perspective, tTile short run disadvantage to the major-
ity is merely one of the prices to be paid to remedy the long-
standing effects of prior discrimination. 
Deprivation of Citizen's Rights 
The Ninth Circuit states that the "stacked deck" program 
"arguably deprives citizens of rights74 • • • whereas a 'reshuffle 
program does not."7G Arguably, "stacked deck" affirmative ac-
tion does deprive the citizen of something - the right to act in a 
racially neutral manner. The quality of this right must, however, 
be examined in light of the judicial interpretation of the laws 
which confer this and other similar rights. 
Since the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,76 the courts have recognized the need for and propriety of 
affirmation action to remedy the effects of prior societal discrim-
ination. The modern trend has been to consistently interpret 
statutes which bar racial discrimination in such a way as to al-
low, or even require, racially conscious action in order to remedy 
"the present effects of past racial discrimination."77 The Su-
preme Court in Bakke affirmed the validity of affirmative action 
in the setting of academic admissions to institutions of higher 
learning. Indeed, four members of the Supreme Court in Bakke 
stated their approval of a quota-type program as a remedial 
measure.78 Also, the Detroit Police court held that section 1981 
does not bar racially . conscious action.79 
"Stacked Deck" Under Other Authorities 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no precedent sug-
gesting a fourteenth amendment duty to engage in "stacked 
73. Id. at 16. 
74. 616 F.2d at 1387 ("e.g., the right to make contracts, free from racial discrimina-
tion; ct. 42 U.S.C. § 1981"). 
75. Id. ("e.g., no 'right' to attend a segregated schoo!."). 
76. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2795 (per Marshall, J., concurring opinion). 
78. 438 U.S. at 378. 
79. 608 F.2d at 692. 
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deck" affirmative action.80 Consequently, the court found that 
the duty did not exist.81 Numerous other authorities, however, 
have recognized the permissibility of "stacked deck" programs 
in various settings.82 
Hiring quotas imposed after judicial findings of discrimina-
tion have long been accepted as a proper remedy under Title vn 
and sections 1981 and 1983.88 Weber made affirmative action 
more attractive to the private sector by allowing adoption of 
programs without the necessity of a showing of prior discrimina-
tion. It is sufficient that the plan is adopted to eliminate tradi-
tional patterns of racial discrimination. Of course, while affirma-
tive action of the quota-type may be permissible under Weber, it 
is not mandatory.84 
The Bakke decision did not foreclose the availability of quo-
tas.81S Justice Powell's opinion expressly approved of preferential 
quotas when predicated upon judicial findings of identified dis-
crimination.86 Nevertheless, nowhere in the Bakke decision did 
the Supreme Court hold that quota-type affirmative action is 
constitutionally required.87 
For about the last ten years the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance has required federal contractors to implement 
affirmative action programs to increase and improve the quality 
of job opportunities for minorities and women pursuant to Exec-
utive Order 11,246.88 Indeed, in Altshuler preferential ratios 
under the Executive Order were approved.8s 
80. 616 F.2d at 1337-88. 
81. ld. 
82. See notes 83-96 infra, and accompanying text. 
83. Edwards, Preferential Remedies and Affirmative Action in Employment in the 
Wake of Bakke, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 113. 
84. See Johnson, One of Weber's Unanswered Questions: How Much Discrimina-
tion Justifies Voluntary Preferential Affirmative Action?, 83 DICKINSON L. REv. 
835(1978-1979). 
85. Edwards, supra note 83, at 123. 
86. 438 U.S. at 307. 
87. See Morrison, Status of Quotas as a Remedy in Discrimination Cases, 66 
J.C.&U.L. 129 (1979-1980). 
88. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,3 C.F.R. 684 
(1966-1970), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e note (1976). 
89. 490 F.2d at 16-19. 
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Executive Order P,246 requires every federal contract to 
contain an enforceable provision guaranteeing that "applicants 
and employees are employed without regard to race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin."oo The implementing regulations91 re-
quire adoption of an affirmative action program "including, 
when there are deficiencies, the development of specific goals 
and timetables02. . . . Goals may not be rigid and inflexible quo-
tas which must be met, but must be targets reasonably attaina-
ble by means of applying every good faith effort to make all as-
pects of the entire affirmative action program work."os 
Furthermore, "[e]ach executive department and agency which 
administers a program involving Federal financial assistance 
shall require as a conc1ition for the approval of any grant . . . 
. the [above] provisions prescribed for Government contracts."o, 
Because the Board was awarding contracts under the 
PWEA, the provisions of Executive Order 11,246 appear to ap-
ply. If the appropriate "deficiencies" were found, the Board 
would be required to develop "specific goals and timetables." 
Obviously, this would mean a "stacked deck" program. Despite 
the clear language and import of Executive Order 11,246 the 
Ninth Circuit fails to mention it in Associated General 
Contractors.05 
The several SOurCl3S of authority which mandate or approve 
of affirmative action suggest a trend towards ameliorating the 
present effects of past discrimination through various experi-
mental methods including quota-type affirmative action. The 
Ninth Circuit holding in Associated General Contractors con-
flicts with this trend! by its broad prohibition of voluntary 
"stacked deck" affirmative action programs under all circum-
stances. Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit may be technically 
correct in its observations that "[n]o authority impels us to find 
a constitutional duty to take 'stacked deck' affirmative action,"06 
it is equally correct to say that substantial authority exists to 
90. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation). 
91. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1980). 
92. ld. 
93. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1977). 
94. 3 C.F.R. 339, 345 (1964-1965 Compilation). 
95. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 108 (1977). 
96. 616 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). 
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support a finding of that duty. 
E. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
The California Supreme Court has recently decided in 
Crawford v. Board of Education,9'1 that "public officials in some 
circumstances bear an affirmative obligation to design programs 
or frame policies so as to avoid discriminatory results."ss The 
I California court, however, declined to impose an affirmative 
duty under the state constitution to take affirmative action of 
the quota variety.99 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not feel 
compelled to find an affirmative duty on the part of the Board 
to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action even under the 
California Constitution, and "especially in areas other than 
school enrollment. "100 
In Crawford the California Supreme CoUrt explained its 
earlier decision in Santa Barbara School District v. Superior 
Court.10l Santa Barbara held that because a specific statutory 
racial balance quota was not constitutionally mandated it was 
invalid. The Crawford Court noted the limited nature of the 
Santa Barbara holding - "our decision upholding the repeal of 
the specific racial balance quotas would 'in no way limit or affect 
the constitutional obligations of school districts.' "102 Thus, while 
Crawford "did not authorize 'stacked deck' affirmative ac-
tion,"I03 such affirmative action remains permissible under the 
California Constitution. 
Crawford held that school districts were required to take 
"reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation."I04 But 
the court did not specify what steps to take. Therefore, the as-
sertion by the Ninth Circuit that under Crawford "school boards 
have an affirmative duty under the state constitution to take 
'reshuffle' affirmative action to alleviate racial segregation in the 
97. 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). 
98. ld. at 296·97, 551 P.2d at 38, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 734. 
99. ld. at 303·04, 551 P.2d at 43, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 739. 
100. 616 F.2d at 1388. 
101. 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 605, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1975). 
102. 17 Cal. 3d at 293, 551 P.2d at 35, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (citing Santa Barbara 
School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 CaL 3d at 330, 530 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 649). 
103. 616 F.2d at 1388. 
104. 17 Cal. 3d at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738. 
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public schools"lOI5 is illusory. 
Recently in Price v. Civil Service Commission of Sacra-
mento County,106 the California Supreme Court upheld a volun-
tary affirmative action program adopted by the Sacramento 
County Civil Service Commission which included a two to one 
minority hiring ratio. The court pointed to its "past decisions 
construing article I, sE~ction 7, subdivision (a) [the state equal 
protection guarantee as reflecting its] recognition of the impor-
tance of interpreting tIne provision in light of the realities of the 
continuing problems faced by minorities today."l07 The court 
held that the plan did not violate federal or state equal protec-
tion guarantees "in authorizing the imposition of remedial race-
conscious hiring ratios to overcome the effects of past discrimi-
natory employment practices. "lOS 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the Price decision was 
based on the "government entity's own past discrimination."l09 
Moreover, the Commission in Price was authorized to make 
proper findings of prior discrimination upon which the remedial 
plan was based. Both of these elements are missing in Associ-
ated General Contractors. Nevertheless, the California Supreme 
Court has demonstrated a peculiar sensitivity to the plight of 
minorities. Associated General Contractors should not be read 
to hold that the California Constitution proscribes the adoption 
of remedial affirmative action programs which incorporate spe-
cific goals or ratios reasonably designed to alleviate the present 
effects of past discrimination. 
F. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE TO WEIGH SOCIAL POLICY 
Legislative Foreclosure 
After determining that there was no constitutional duty to 
engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action, the Ninth Circuit 
held that it was "constitutionally acceptable" for the state legis-
lature to foreclose the Board from voluntarily adopting an af-
105. 616 F.2d at 1388. 
106. 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980). 
107. ld. at 284-85, 604 P.2d at 1382, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (citing Crawford v. Board 
of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976». 
108. ld. at 283,604 P.2d at 1381, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
109. 616 F.2d at 1385 n.4. 
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firmative action policy.110 The court noted that "stacked deck" 
affirmative action is the type of policy question over which the 
Legislature has greater competence than a local agency like the 
Board.l11 Legislative interpretations or foreclosures of "stacked 
deck" type programs are appropriate subjects for legislative con-
sideration. The legislative foreclosure adverted to by the Ninth 
Circuit is, however, contained in California Education Code sec-
tion 39640-the "low bid law"-and is based upon the court's 
strict construction of that section and not upon a "stacked 
deck" statute. The foreclosure found by the court in the low bid 
law was not explicitly articulated by the legislature and absent 
the finding by the court of implicit foreclosure in the statute, 
there would have been no conflict. A more liberal construction of 
the low bid law would allow voluntary adoption of quota-type 
affirmative action policies. 
The Washington v. Davis1u Test 
Although not unconstitutional per se because of its prohibi-
tion of the Board's affirmative action program, the Ninth Circuit 
held the low bid law must still survive scrutiny under the test 
articulated in Washington v. Davis.11s The Washington Court 
stated that "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise 
within the power of government to pursue, is [not] invalid under 
the equal protection clause simply because it may affect a 
greater proportion of one race than of another. "114 Even in cases 
involving discriminatory impact, "the invidious quality of a law 
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced 
to a racially discriminatory purpose."115 Noting that section 
39640 is race-neutral on its face, and acknowledging that the low 
bid law may have a disproportionate impact on minorities, the 
Ninth Circuit held that "this is not a case where the disparity of 
a law's impact 'may for all practical purposes demonstrate un-
constitutionality because . . . the discrimination is very difficult 
to explain on nonracial grounds,' thus permitting an inference of 
discriminatory purpose."I1t! Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ulti-
110. [d. at 1390. 
111. [d. 
112. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
113. 616 F.2d at 1390. 
114. 426 U.S. at 242. 
115. [d. at 240. 
116. 616 F.2d at 1390 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242). 
31
Beverly and Blystone: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
112 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:94 
mately upheld the low bid law as a constitutionally permissible 
application of the legislature's discretionary powers.1l7 
Replying to a similar conclusion, the Sixth Circuit in De-
troit Police reversed a district court opinion stating that it had 
failed to follow those portions of the Washington v. Davis opin-
ion which gave guidance on evaluating proof of discriminatory 
purpose. us Detroit Police pointed to portions of Washington 
which indicated that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose 
need not be express or appear on the face of the statute, nor is 
the law's disproportionate impact irrelevant in cases involving 
constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.1l9 A facially 
race-neutral statute must not be applied so as indiviously to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.l2G An invidious discriminatory 
purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, 
for example, if the law bears more heavily on one race than an-
other.l2l It is also frequently true that the discriminatory impact 
may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality 
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very diffi-
cult to explain on nonracial grounds.l22 The Supreme Court ob-
served that it had not held facially race-neutral laws that serve 
ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, inva-
lid under the equal protection clause simply because they may 
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.l2S "Dis-
proportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by 
the Constitution."l2' 
The Detroit Police court then pointed to two Supreme 
Court cases which enumerated a number of "subjects of proper 
inquiry" to determins the existence of discriminatory intent.l211 
For instance, 
[t]he racial impact of the official action, the his-
torical backgyound of decisions having disparate 
117. Id. at 1391. 
118. 608 F.2d at 692. 
119.Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122.Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 692-93. 
125. Id. at 693. 
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racial impact, and the contemporary statements 
of members of the decision-making body were 
types of relevant evidence which should be con-
sidered .... [A]ctions having foreseeable and an-
ticipated disparate impact . . . may be employed 
"as one of the several kinds of proofs from which 
the inference of segregative intent may be prop-
erly drawn. "126 
113 
The court concluded that discriminatory intent may be estab-
lished by "any evidence which logically supports an inference 
that the state action was characterized by invidious .purpose."12'1 
The Washington v. Davis test complements other evidence 
which may be brought to bear upon the question of invidious 
discrimination. Taken by itself, Washington v. Davis makes it 
"nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prove unlawful 'motive' in 
most cases, especially when the challenged employment practice 
is facially neutral, but has a greater adverse effect on minority 
persons. "I28 
Unless Washington v. Davis is read in context with the sev-
eral other decisions interpreting proof of invidious discrimina-
tion, i~ meaning is subject to distortion. The Ninth Circuit de- . 
termined that the low bid law passed the Washington v. Davis 
test. This may be interpreted to mean that merely because the 
law creates a disparate impact upon minorities it is not per se 
unconstitutional and that further examination is therefore 
unnecessary. 
G. 'CONCLUSION 
In Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School District the Ninth Circuit invalidated a voluntary 
affirmative action program of the quota type adopted by the San 
Francisco Board of Education. The court's analysis reached sev-
eral conclusions. First, the Ninth Circuit determined that there 
was a fundamental conflict between California's low bid law and 
the Board's affirmative action policy. Since the statute which 
confers the Board's authority proscribes such conflicts, the af-
126. [d. 
127. [d. (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979). 
128. Edwards, supra note 83, at 119. 
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firmative action policy was found to be outside the scope of the 
Board's authority. 
,The conflict rests upon a strict construction of the low bid 
law by the Ninth Circuit, precluding race-conscious affirmative 
action programs. A more encouraging result for proponents of 
affirmative action could have been reached by a liberal interpre-
tation of the statute. ,]~his would have allowed adoption of some 
race-conscious programs and still enable the courts to find a 
conflict where reverse invidious discrimination was evident. 
Second, using newly created terminology, the Ninth Circuit 
found no affirmative constitutional duty to take "stacked deck" 
affirmative action under the United States and the California 
constitutions. The court's definition of "stacked deck" is subject 
to varying interpretations and makes the holding suspect. Al-
though a quota-type or "positive-factor" program is still permis-
sible in spite of the court's holding, without a precise definition 
of "stacked deck" affirmative action, many race-conscious pro-
grams which stop short of imposing quotas or goals may be faced 
with substantial new roadblocks. Moreover, the holding has the 
effect of stifling much needed experimentation with race-con-
scious affirmative action. 
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Detroit Police, which upheld 
the validity of a quota-type affirmation plan, is in direct conflict 
with Associated General Contractors. Unlike Associated Gen-
eral Contractors, the Detroit Police court followed a line of 
cases approving the use of quota-type affirmative action pro-
grams when employed to ameliorate the present effects of past 
discrimination. Various limitations have been placed upon these 
plans to ensure their administration free from abuse.129 A prop-
erly designed quota-type affirmative action program takes into 
account the dangers inherent in "stacked deck" programs and is 
an appropriate remedial vehicle. The ultimate resolution of this 
129. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (Powell, J., concurring) (re-
viewing the requirements imposed by the courts when considering race-conscious affirm-
ative action); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 
(1972) (the plan must be ShOl1; term after which all decisions are to be made on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Servo Comm'n, 
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (quota must be reasonably 
related to the relevant percentage of minorities in the work force). 
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controversy, however, awaits a ruling by the Supreme Court. 
Insofar as the California Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
particular awareness of the effects of a history of discrimination 
against minorities, it appears the court would be receptive to a 
suggestion that a properly designed quota-type program is con-
stitutionally permissible and even required under appropriate 
circumstances. The broad prohibition in Associated General 
Contractors of voluntary adoption of "stacked deck" affirmative 
action programs is therefore especially questionable under the 
California Constitution. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit decided that, the low bid law was 
not constitutional as applied. Because this portion of the opinion 
turned on a strict construction of the low bid law and of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is ame-
nable to the same criticism and mandates an identical concern. 
The court's best argument came from its perception that 
"even if the argued-for constitutional duty exists, it could not 
come into play until proper findings were made of discrimina-
tion and the need for affirmative action to redress it. "130 In 
Bakke, Justice Powell noted that "a governmental body must 
have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, 
that the classification is responsive to identified discrimina-
tion. "131 The Bakke court failed to find that a medical school 
had the authority to make appropriate findings with respect to 
its own admissions program. It is, therefore, unlikely that the 
same court would hold that the Board has authority to mBke 
appropriate findings regarding discrimination in the local con-
struction industry. 
Because the Board overstepped its authority in making 
findings of discrimination in the local construction industry, the 
ultimate holding of the court in Associated General Contractors 
appears to be correct. Despite this fact, however, Associated 
General Contractors is antithetical to the modern trend of 
widening the scope of remedies available to minorities to relieve 
130. 616 F.2d at 1388. 
131. 438 U.S. at 309. 
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the present effects of past discrimination. It should therefore be 
limited to its facts. 
Brian Beverly* 
m. RESIDENT RE:QUffiEMENTS AND THE FORMER 
RESIDENT'S RIGHT TO TRAVEL - FISHER V. 
REISER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Fisher v. Reiser,l a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the constitutionality of Nevada's industrial insurance 
scheme which provided workers' compensation benefits irrespec-
tive of the recipient's place of residence, but which conditioned 
receipt of cost-of-livilng supplemental benefits on residence in 
the state. Plaintiff claimed that the residence requirement for 
the workers' compensation cost-of-living supplement penalized 
those beneficiaries who exercised their constitutional right to 
emigrate from one sta,te to another, and denied them equal pro-
tection under the law. 
Pursuant to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act,2 the Ne-
vada Industrial Commission administered a state insurance fund 
which was financed by employer premiums and used to pay 
workers' compensatio:n benefits to injured workers and their sur-
vivors. An employee who was injured while working in Nevada 
for a covered Nevada employer was eligible to receive workers' 
compensation.s Worker's benefits were payable regardless of 
where the beneficiary resided after his or her injury. 
Because the level of benefits available to an injured worker 
or his or her survivors was based on a percentage of the wage 
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were 
East, D.J., sitting by designation, and Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
2. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 616.010-.680 (1977). 
3. Also eligible were workers hired or regularly employed in Nevada who were in-
jured while temporarily working for their covered Nevada employer outside the state. [d. 
§ 616.520. 
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earned by the worker at the time of injury;' inflation particularly 
hurt workers' compensation recipients. In response to their 
plight, in 1973 and again in 1975, the Nevada Legislature appro-
priated general funds to supplement workers' benefits paid to 
recipients of permanent and total disability and death benefits. II 
Unlike the basic workers' benefits, the cost-of-living supplemen-
tal benefits were not granted to those workers' compensation 
beneficiaries who had emigrated from Nevada.6 
Plaintiff, Mrs. Fisher, and her husband were Nevada re-
sidents when, in 1962, plaintiff's husband was rendered totally 
disabled in an industrial accident while employed by a Nevada 
employer. Under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, plaintiff's 
husband qualified for and received permanent total disability 
benefits and continued to receive these benefits after plaintiff 
and her husband moved to California. When plaintiff's husband 
died in 1972, plaintiff became eligible for and received death 
benefits'1 because her husband's death resulted from the injuries 
he sustained in the workers' compensation-covered accident. 
However, plaintiff was not eligible for the cost-of-living supple-
ment because she was no longer a Nevada resident. 
Plaintiff brought an action in federal district COurt,8 con-
4. The level of benefits available to the injured worker or his survivors was depen-
dent upon the nature of the injury and the average wage of the worker at the time of the 
injury. Until death, permanently and totally disabled workers were entitled to monthly 
payments of two-thirds of their average wage. ld. § 616.580. The surviving spouse of an 
employee whose death was caused by a job-related accident was entitled to death bene-
fits of the same monthly amount. Death benefits were paid until the surviving spouse's 
death or remarriage. ld. § 616.615. 
5. In 1973, permanent total disability benefits for industrial injuries occurring 
before April 9, 1971 were increased by 10%, and death benefits based on industrial inju-
ries occurring before July 1, 1973 were also increased by 10%. In 1975 the same benefit 
adjustment was increased to 20%. ld. §§ 616.626,616.628. 
The cost-of-living supplement was paid out of a silicosis and disabled pension fund 
which had been established by an appropriation from general revenues when the Nevada 
Legislature extended workers' compensation to persons injured by exposure to silicon 
dioxide dust. This fund was used to reimburse the Nevada Industrial Commission for 
payment of silicosis claims and the cost-of-living supplement in disability and death ben-
efit cases. ld. §§ 617.323, 617.460. 
6. ld. §§ 616.626, 616.628. 
7. Mrs. Fisher received death benefits equal to one-half of Mr. Fisher's average wage 
because Mr. Fisher was injured prior to the date when death benefits were increased to 
two-thirds of the deceased employee's average wage. ld. § 616.615. 
8. Mrs. Fisher brought a class action on behalf of all non-resident workers' compen-
sation beneficiaries not receiving the cost-of-living Bupplement, seeking declaratory and 
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tending that the residence requirement for the cost-of-living 
supplement impermissibly burdened her constitutional right to 
travel, and denied her equal protection under the law.9 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 
In recent years the Supreme Court has attempted to deline-
ate the constitutional right to travel, a right long recognized as 
fundamental. lo In the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thompsonll 
the Court struck down state statutesl2 conditioning eligibility for 
welfare upon a one year durational residence. Viewing the right 
to travel as including the right to migrate, "with intent to settle 
and abide,"I8 the Court found that conditioning eligibility for 
welfare upon a one year durational residence penalized those 
persons who had exercised their constitutional right to travel. l • 
Finding the fundamental right to travel impinged, the Court 
subjected the durational residence requirement to the strict 
scrutiny standard of review,lII and found the requirement unnec-
injunctive relief against officials of the Nevada Industrial Commission and the Nevada 
State Treasurer. Federal jurisdiction was invoked under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
9. The district court refuJJed to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. The 
court held that the Nevada scheme involved a simple residency requirement which fell 
outside the scope of the constitutional right to travel. Applying the rational basis stan-
dard of review, the district court found no equal protection violation because the resi-
dence requirement was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of pro-
tecting the health and welfare of Nevada's citizens while limiting the expenditure of 
general revenues. 610 F.2d at 633. 
10. The constitutionlll right to travel from one State to another 
• . • occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our 
Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established 
and repeatedly recognized. 
. . . • [Tlhe right finds no explicit mention in the Consti-
tution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right 80 
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a neces-
sary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution cre-
ated. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United 
States has long been recognized as a basic right under the 
Constitution. 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). 
11. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
12. Shapiro also involved a District of Columbia statutory provision. 
13. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1973) (noting that the 
Court in Shapiro was "concerned only with the right to migrate, 'with intent to settle 
and abide' or . . . 'to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life.' "). 
14. The Court did not require evidence of actual deterence. See Memorial Hosp. v. 
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972). 
15. Classifications that inlpinge on a fundamental right or that are based on suspect 
criteria such as race are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. Otherwise a 
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essary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Accord-
ingly, the Court held the requirement invalid because it denied 
new residents equal protection under the law. 
The Shapiro Court made clear that "[t]he residence re-
quirement and the waiting-period requirement are distinct and 
independent prerequisites,"18 and that it was only the waiting 
period which implicated right-to-travel concerns in that case. 
Two extremely important questions were left unresolved. First, 
how severely must the constitutional right to travel be burdened 
before the burden operates to penalize those individuals who 
choose to exercise the right?l'1 Second, can a bona fide residence 
requirement for government monetary benefits ever unduly im-
pinge the right to travel?18 
The :first question was addressed, but by no means com-
pletely resolved, five years later in Memorial Hospital v. Mari-
copa County,19 in which the Court invalidated a one year dura-
tional county residence requirement for nonemergency medical 
rational basis standard of review is invoked. To survive an equal protection challenge 
under strict scrutiny, a statutory classification must be necessary to promote a compel-
ling governmental interest, whereas, under the rational basis test, a statutory classifica-
tion is not violative of equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. See generally Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1975): Note, The Right to Travel - Quest For a Constitutional 
Source, 6 RUT. CAM. L.J. 122 (1974); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - For-
ward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). 
16. 395 U.S. 618, 636 (1969). A simple residence requirement requires a person to be 
present, i.e. be a bona fide resident. A durational residence requirement requires a per-
son to have been a resident for a given period of time as a condition to eligibility for a 
government benefit. 
17. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974) ("amount 
of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear" 
in Shapiro). 
18. In leaving these two questions unresolved, the Court stated: 
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or resi-
dence requirements determinint eligibility to vote, eligibility 
for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a pro-
fession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may 
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the 
other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitu-
tional right of interstate travel 
394 U.S. at 638 n.21. 
19. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Two years earlier, the Court held that one-year durational 
residence requirements for voting were invalid on the ground that the right to exercise 
the franchise is a fundamental right. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
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care. "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty 
analysis," the Maricopa Court stated that a classification penal-
izes the exercise of the right to travel if it denies "a basic neces-
sity of life," or "governmental privileges or benefits necessary to 
basic sustenance. "20 
In Califano v. Torres21 the Court upheld a requirement of 
residence in one of the fifty states (the ciaimant had moved to 
Puerto Rico) in order to be eligible for various old age and disa-
bility benefits under the Supplemental Security Income Act. 
The Court held that the Constitution does not embrace a doc-
trine whereby a perSOll who moves to Puerto Rico must be given 
benefits superior to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto 
Rico. The Court went on to state in dictum: 
Such a doctrine would apply with equal force to 
any benefits a State might provide for its re-
sidents, and would require a State to continue to 
pay those benefits indefinitely to any persons who 
had once resided there. And the broader implica-
tions of such a doctrine in other areas of substan-
tive law would bid fair to destroy the independent 
power of each state under our Constitution to en-
act laws uniformly applicable to all of its 
residents.lUI 
The Ninth Circuit in Fisher primarily focused on these Su-
preme Court precedents in resolving the constitutionality of Ne-
vada's industrial insurance scheme. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Majority Opinion 
Construing Shapiro, Maricopa County, and Torres to stand 
for the proposition tTrlat the right to migrate component of the 
right to travel insures that only new residents-and not former 
residents-of a state to have a right to vital government bene-
fits, the majority fOUlad the faet that Fisher arose in an emigra-
tion context to be u<:ritical." Because the cost-of-living supple-
ment was financed by general funds, the majority analogized the 
supplement to welfare benefits. On this basis, the majority found 
20. 415 U.S. at 258-59. 
21. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam). 
22. [d. at 4-5. 
40
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/6
1981] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 
principles of federalism to be of overriding importance, stating 
that "a state is limited, both in its competence and its responsi-
bility, to exercising its welfare powers for those persons who are 
its residents."23 With principles of federalism placing "[a]ny pri-
mary obligation to ascertain a citizen's economic status or condi-
tion and to make provision for his or her well-being ... upon 
the state of current residence, not the state where the citizen 
formerly resided,"24 the majority concluded that Mrs. Fisher and 
others in her class were not penalized for exercising their consti-
tutional right to travel. 
In further distinguishing Fisher from Shapiro and Mari-
copa County, the majority noted that only certain durational 
residence requirements were invalidated in Shapiro and Mari-
copa County, and held that Fisher involved only a simple resi-
dence requirement. Close analysis reveals that this second basis 
for distinguishing Fisher is actually"an integral part of the immi-
gration/emigration distinction. In construing Shapiro and Mari-
copa County as standing for the proposition that the right to 
travel insures only new residents a right to certain government 
benefits, the majority effectively ruled out the possibility that in 
an emigration context a right-to-travel claim could present a du-
rational residence requirement. That is, for the majority, the 
concept of durational residence can only be applicable in an im-
migration context. Because Fisher arose in an emigration con-
text, Fisher necessarily presented to the majority only a simple 
residence requirement. Thus, this purported second basis for 
distinguishing Fisher from Shapiro and Maricopa County is not 
a separate distinction, but is simply an attribute of the distinc-
tion between immigration and emigration. 
The majority proceeded to find Shapiro and Maricopa 
County unsupportive of the plaintiff in Fisher on a third basis, 
and in so doing, confused its analysis. Having "a significant 
bearing upon [the majority's] decision" was the fact that, unlike 
the benefits involved in Shapiro and Maricopa County, eligibil-
ity for the cost-of-living supplement was not based upon the re-
23. 610 F.2d at 633. Thus, the majority was "reluctant to impose upon states fiscal 
burdens that are not coterminous either with their taxing power or their general jurisdic-
tion." ld. at 634. 
24. ld. at 633. The majority did leave open the possibility that a state may be held 
to have some continuing obligations to former residents. 
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cipient's financial need. The majority construed Supreme Court 
precedent to stand for the proposition that the deprivation of a 
government benefit not based upon the recipient's financial need 
is not of such severity as to penalize an individual for exercising 
the right to travel. On this basis the majority concluded that the 
residence requirement did not penalize the plaintiff in Fisher. 
The majority's severity-of-the-burden analysis only serves 
to confuse the actual basis for the holding in Fisher. If, as the 
majority apparently held, a classification based upon residence is 
not "subject to strict scrutiny when attacked by one who has 
migrated from the state which denies the benefit in question,"211 
then the severity of the deprivation suffered by the emigrant is 
irrelevant. Simply put, if principles of federalism are of such im-
portance that the right to travel does not mandate that a state 
provide former residents with the same government benefits as 
are provided residents, then the importance of the benefit to the 
otherwise eligible form.er resident is simply not an issue. In Sha-
piro and Maricopa County. it was necessary to resolve the ques-
tion of the severity of the burden imposed upon the right to 
travel in order to determine whether the government's justifica-
tion had to meet the strict scrutiny or the rational basis stan-
dard of judicial review. 26 This was unnecessary in Fisher because 
the majority had already determined that strict scrutiny was in-
appropriate in an emigration context. Had the majority's finding 
as to the severity of the deprivation suffered by the Fisher 
claimants been the basis for an alternative holding rather than 
having had "a significant bearing" upon the overall decision, 
perhaps the rationale for the decision would have been clearer. 
The Fisher opinion did not make clear whether the right to 
travel was not sufficiently infringed solely on the ground that 
the plaintiff was a former resident, that is, because federalism 
considerations are tantamount to a compelling governmental in-
terest, or because the Fisher claimants ended up on the losing 
side of a balancing test in which concerns of federalism were 
weighed against the degree of the deprivation they suffered. 
25. Id. at 633. 
26. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 253 ("In determining whether 
the challenged durational residence provision violates the Equal Protection Clause, we 
must first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must 
meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests 
affected."). 
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Whatever the reason for finding that the fundamental right 
to travel was not infringed in Fisher, the majority proceeded to 
subject the Nevada statutory classification to the deferential ra-
tional basis standard of review. As the residence requirement for 
the workers' compensation supplement was rationally related to 
the legitimate governmental interests of protecting the welfare 
of Nevada's citizens while limiting the expenditure of state 
funds,27 the majority held there was no equal protection 
violation.28 
Dissenting Opinion 
Dissenting, Judge Hufstedler took a broader view of Su-
preme Court precedent, maintaining that the distinction be-
tween emigration and immigration "has no constituitonal signifi-
cance because interstate travel is not a one-way road. "29 For the 
dissent, a durational residence requirement "occurs when a per-
son is effectively required to have resided in a State at two dis-
tinct points in time in order to obtain a benefit."so Since the 
workers' compensation beneficiaries were "effectively required to 
have resided in the state at the time of their injury and at pre-
sent" to be eligible for the cost-of-living supplement, the dissent 
maintained that the durational aspect of residence, at issue in 
Shaprio and Maricopa County, was present in Fisher. 
Accordingly, the dissent viewed the workers' cost-of-living 
supplement as being unlike welfare because the "essential nexus 
of eligibility" was a past connection with the state-past em-
ployment and injury in the state. In distinguishing the simple 
residence requirements that the Shapiro, Maricopa County, and 
Torres Courts held valid in the context of welfare, nonemer-
27. For the majority, the fact that the residence requirement partially obstructed 
the objective of providing workers' compensation beneficiaries with additional income 
was not important because there were other legitimate governmental interests furthered 
by the residence requirement. 
28. The majority noted that the allocation of government revenues demands a high 
degree of judicial deference when no suspect classification or fundamental right is in-
volved. See, e.g., Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) ("Governmental deci-
sions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another 
are 'not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to [the Legislature], unless the 
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.' ") 
(quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937». 
29. 610 F.2d at 640. 
30.ld. 
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gency medical care, and Supplemental Security Income benefits, 
respectively, the dissent observed that bona fide residence was 
"the nexus of eligibility for those benefits." That is, once a resi-
dent, there was no eligibility requirement of a past connection 
with the state. In the context of workers' benefits which are 
designed to compensate injured workers and their survivors for 
loss of earning power caused by injuries sustained while contrib-
uting to a state's labor force, the dissent maintained that "to 
require a present connection • . . unduly penalizes plaintiff's 
constitutional right to travel. "S1 Accordingly, the fact that the 
worker's supplement was subsidized by general revenues was of 
no importance to the dissent because "[t]he method that the 
state chooses to financt~ payment of workers' benefits does not 
mean that the state may discriminate against eligible workers 
solely because they exercise their right to travel. "82 
Having found the durational aspect of residence present in 
Fisher, the dissent proceeded to find the deprivation suffered by 
the former-resident workers' compensation beneficiaries to be of 
such severity as to conutitute a penalty for having exercised the 
right to travel. For thE~ dissent, the deprivation of the cost-of-
living supplement was analogous to those deprivations found to 
impermissibly burden the right :to travel in Shapiro and Mari-
copa County because i.t was "aid upon which may depend the 
ability ... to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, 
and other necessities of life."s8 The dissent was unable to con-
strue Supreme Court precedent as holding that the benefit in 
question must be baaed upon the recipient's financial need 
before the deprivation of the benefit may constitute a penalty 
for exercising the right to travel. Undoubtedly, the dissent ap-
proached the question of the severity of the burden in accor-
dance with Supreme Court precedent. Although Shapiro and 
31. [d. at 641. As discussed later in the text, the dissent found that the denial of the 
cost-of-living supplement to former-resident workers' compensation beneficiaries rose to 
the level of a penalty as delineated in Shapiro and Maricopa County. 
. 32. [d. at 641. In further support of the argument that the cost-of-living supplement 
was not welfare, but instead was part of the workers' compensation program, the dissent 
noted that general funds were appropriated to extend workers' compensation to workers 
contracting silicosis while working in Nevada. The dissent also noted that, unlike the 
benefits involved in Torres, the cost-of-living supplement would not have provided for-
mer residents of Nevada with benefits superior to those enjoyed by citizens of the former 
resident's new state of residence. 
33. [d. at 642 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 627). 
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Maricopa County involved benefits where eligibility was condi-
tioned upon the recipient's financial need, the Supreme Court 
focused on the actual significance to the claimant of the benefit 
in question rather than on the criteria establishing eligibility. 
Thus, although a government benefit not conditioned upon 
financial need is likely to be less significant to the recipient than 
a benefit which is not so conditioned, to find the absence of a 
financial need requirement conclusive as to the insignificance of 
the benefit is simplistic. U One might speculate whether the ma-
jority would have reached the same conclusion had plaintiff re-
turned to Nevada and had been required to wait one year before 
being eligible for the cost-of-living supplement. Apparently the 
majority was reluctant to expressly elevate federalism considera-
tions to the level of compelling governmental interests. Thus, 
the fact that eligibility for the supplement was not based upon' 
financial need provided the majority with a convenient escape. 
The dissent, having found that the residence requirement 
for the cost-of-living supplement effectively penalized those 
workers' compensation beneficiaries who exercised their consti-
tutional right to travel, applied the strict scrutiny standard of 
review to the statutory classification. The conservation of state 
funds was the only justification offered by Nevada for discrimi-
nating against former resident workers' compensation benefi-
ciaries. Because this is not a compelling governmental interest,a5 
the dissent found the residence requirement violative of equal 
protection. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fisher indicates, the con-
stitutional right to travel, although fundamental, remains quite 
34. The majority had found support for the notion that severity-of-the-burden anal-
ysis turns on whether eligibility for a government benefit is conditioned upon financial 
need in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where disability benefits were termi-
nated. Although the Court found the disability benefits to be of less significance than 
welfare benefits because the former were not based on financial need, Mathews involved 
a due process claim, whereas Fisher involved an equal protection claim. Also, unlike 
Fisher, the disability benefits in Mathews would have been paid on proof that the claim-
ant was still disabled. 
35. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 263 ("The conserva-
tion of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a dura-
tional residence requirement which. • • severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely 
migrate and settle in another state."). 
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amorphous. The majority's simplistic approach to the right to 
travel claim presented in Fisher may lead other courts to find 
that eligibility for a government benefit must be conditioned 
upon the recipient's financial need before right-to-travel con-
cerns are implicated. U courts adopt the majority's approach, 
the question of the actual significance of the benefit in question 
to a potential recipient will be of secondary importance, only be-
coming an issue if the henefit is based upon financial need. Un-
fortunately, as the dissllmt in Fisher indicated, a financial need 
requirement is certainly not determinative of whether a benefit 
is "aid upon which mBLY depend the ability ... to obtain the 
very means to subsist." Adopting the majority's approach will, in 
effect, base the resolution of right to travel issues on matters of 
form rather than substance. The fundamental right to travel 
should certainly not be: delineated in such a manner. 
Other courts should avoid Fisher and continue to adhere to 
the idea "that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitu-
tional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citi-
zens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our 
land uninhibited by StaLtuteS, rules, and regulations which unrea-
sonably burden or restrict this movement. "86 
Curtis E. Blystone* 
IV. COMPLEX CASES: AN EXCEPTION TO THE SEV-
ENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation1 (USF Litiga-
tion), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
question of "whether there is a 'complexity' exception to the 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases."2 The trial 
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629. 
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were 
Kilkenny, J., dissenting, and Byrne, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 
1866 (1980). 
2. ld. at 413. 
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court had struck sua sponte all demands for trial by jury on the 
ground that the complicated nature of the litigation was such as 
to render it beyond the practical abilities and limitations of a 
jury.3 
USF Litigation involved eighteen separate lawsuits,' includ-
ing five plaintiff classes, filed by a variety of plaintiffs, most of 
whom were pUrchasers or representatives of purchasers of vari-
ous stock and debenture offerings made by U.S. Financial5 
(USF) over a period of several years. Although USF was the fo-
cal point of all the controversy, over one hundred defendants 
were involved in the litigation, including about twenty individ-
ual defendants and over eighty corporate and partnership defen-
dants. The litigation was further complicated by the fact that 
within some of the cases there were sub-groups of plaintiffs as-
serting claims against sub-groups of defendants. Numerous 
cross-claims were made by certain defendants against various 
other defendants. A multitude of allegations were made and a 
multitude of claims asserted-all dealing with violations of fed-
eral and state securities laws, common law fraud, and negligence. 
The trial court found that the fact-finder would have to 
read about 100,000 pages of documents,6 that about 250 wit-
nesses would be called by the plaintiffs alone, '1 and that the trial 
would probably last two years.8 Central to the litigation was the 
fact-finder's ability to understand the massive and complex ac-
3. See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977). The trial 
court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 
4. The various lawsuits were filed in five federal judicial districts including the fed-
eral court for the Southern District of California. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation found that the cases presented common issues and allegations and were ac-
cordingly transferred to the Southern District of California for coordinated pretrial pro-
ceedings. See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 385 F. Supp. 586 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 
1974); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1403 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1974). 
5. U.S. Financial was a large vertically integrated corporation which was engaged in 
virtually all aspects of the real estate development business, including design, construc-
tion, and sale of various kinds of structures, financing of real estate projects, and title 
insurance. It operated individually, through subsidiaries, and through the concept of 
joint ventures. Its growth from 1966 to 1972 had been phenomenal. 
6. The district court stated that "reading those 100,000 pieces of paper would be 
like sitting down to read the first 90 volumes of the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series -in-
cluding all the headnotes." In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. 
Cal. 1977). 
7. Id. at 707-08. 
8. Id. at 713. 
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counts and the accounting procedures employed by USF, its 
subsidiaries, and its joint venture partners. The fact-finder 
would also be required to understand various competing and 
highly technical accounting theories in order to ascertain 
whether the accounting practices of USF and its affiliates were 
as they should have been. The fact-finder would also be required 
to undersand and apply a variety of legal theories, which varied, 
of course, depending upon the claims and parties at issue. 
The trial court concluded that a jury was not capable of un-
derstanding and rationally reconciling the voluminous data and 
then properly applying the variety of legal theories. The trial 
court further concluded that it would be extremely difficult to 
find jurors who could sit through a two-year trial. On these 
grounds the trial court concluded that there was no adequate 
remedy at law, and thus ordered that the cases be tried without 
a jury.9 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding "that there is no com-
plexity exception to the seventh amendment right to jury trial in 
civil cases. "10 "We do not accept the underlying premise . . . 
'that a single judge is brighter than the jurors collectively func-
tioning together.' "11 
B. BACKGROUND 
Traditionally, the scope of the seventh amendment12 guar-
antee has been determined by applying a "historical test" which 
looks to the English common law as it existed in 1791, the time . 
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.1s Although "the thrust of 
9. Id. at 711-15. 
10. 609 F.2d at 432. 
11. Id. at 431, (quoting Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and 
the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 53 (1977». 
12. The seventh amendment provides: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexam-
ined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. Vil. 
13. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333 (1979); Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 
654, 657 (1935) ("The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed 
under the English common law when the amendment was adopted."); Dimick v. Schiedt, 
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the amendment was to preserve the right to trial by jury as it 
existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends 
beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that 
time."14 Thus, the critical dividing line under the historical test 
is between "law" and "equity."15 
The historical test has been applied to "preserve the sub-
stance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished 
293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). 
14. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 193; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374 
(1974) (quoting Curtis v. Loether). Thus, the seventh amendment has been found appli-
cable to causes of action based on statutes which create legal rights and remedies. See, 
e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 375-76; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 
469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); 
Luria v. United States, 231.U.S. 9 (1913); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 
(1909) (immigration laws). 
15. In describing this distinction, the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 
(3 Pet.) 433 (1830), stated: 
By common law, [the framers of the seventh amendment] 
meant what the constitution denominated in the third article 
"law;" not merely suits, which the common law recognized 
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal 
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-dis-
tinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, 
and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in the 
admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and 
equity, was often found in the same suit. 
Id. at 446. Accord, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 449 (1977); Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 US. 363, 374-75 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970). 
Apparently, reference to the English common law and the subsequent establishment 
of the historical test were more or less accidental developments. See generally Wolfram, 
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973). 
Justice Story was apparently the first to refer to English common law as the foundation 
for seventh amendment analysis: 
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not 
the common law of any individual state (for it probably differs 
in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reser-
voir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to 
expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be 
obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the 
law: 
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.D. Mass. 1812). Wolfram stated that this 
rule has never been seriously questioned; "perhaps later judges have hesitated to appear 
to be the kind of intractable person that would require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on 
the obvious." Wolfram, supra, at 641. 
At any rate, once reference to English practice became accepted, the historical test 
followed. Wolfram suggested that this was probably required in order to prevent the 
seventh amendment's guarantee from depending upon changes which occurred in En-
glish practice with respect to jury trials long after Amerian independence. See Wolfram, 
supra, at 642. It seems only logical to adopt some sort of historical standard in that the 
seventh amendment requires that "the right of trial by jury be preserved." 
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from mere matters of form or procedure .... "16 Thus, although 
procedural changes since 1791 have contracted the civil jury's 
historical role to some extent, they have been held as not viola-
tive of the seventh amendment.17 ' 
Other procedural changes have had the effect of expanding 
the right to trial by jury, particularly the merger of the federal 
law and equity courts lit} 1938 and the accompanying new Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the merger of law and 
equity was not intended to affect the scope of the right to trial 
by jury,16 a problem was created as to those matters in which the 
plaintiff previously "had an option as to the mode of trial that 
excluded any option by defendant or any discretion by the court 
.... [T]he [post-merger] question, properly put, [was] between 
giving effect to the plaintiff's former option and giving defen-
dant a counter-option .... "19 The Supreme Court addressed 
16. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. lbldman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). See also 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) ("the Amendment was designed to 
preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the 
great mass of procedural forms and details •.•. "); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. at 392). 
17. See e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335-37 (1979) (use of of-
fensive collateral estoppel when plaintiff was not a party to the previous proceedings is 
not inconsistent with seventh amendment even though mutuality of parties was required 
in 1791); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156·57 (1973) (seventh amendment does not 
require 12-member jury); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (directed 
verdict not inconsistent with seventh amendment); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Re· 
fining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (verdict may be set aside in part and new trial or· 
dered on the relevant issues); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920) (court ap-
pointed auditor for purpose of examining accounts between the parties and simplifying 
and defining issues to be presented to jury does not violate seventh amendment); Walker 
v. New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (general verdict may be set aside 
when inconsistent with special verdict and judgnIent entered on basis of special verdict). 
18. FED. R. ClV. P. 38(a) provides that: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States 
shall.be preserved to the parties inviolate." 
19. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIV1L PROCEDURE § 8.7, at 374-75 (2d ed. 1977). Judge 
Wisdom described the problenl as follows: 
[T]he liberal joinder provisions and the broad, sometimes 
mandatory, counterclaim provisions of the Federal Rules 
mixed legal and equitable causes in a single litigation with un-
precedented frequency . • . • The difficulty comes in deciding 
whether the legal or the equitable cause should be tried 
first-an issue of practical importance to litigants, since the 
determination of either cause acts as collateral estoppel on 
common questions of fact in the other. The broad grant of dis-
cretion under Rule 42 for a trial judge to order separate trials 
would seem to imply authority to decide the order of the sepa-
• 
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this problem in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. WestoverO and in 
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.21 In each case identical factual is-
sues were presented in the legal and equitable claims. In the 
Dairy Queen opinion the Court stated that: 
The holding in Beacon Theatres was that where 
both legal and equitable issues are presented in a 
single case, "only under the most imperative cir-
cumstances, circumstances which in view of the 
flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we can-
not now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of 
legal issues be lost through prior determination of 
equitable Claims."22 
This Beacon Theatres/Dairy Queen "nature of the issue" test 
operated to expand the traditional historical test, giving the de-
fendant a right to jury trial where previously there was no right. 
However, the question of whether the Beacon Theatres/Dairy 
Queen holding was constitutionally required, or only represented 
an "equitable doctrine," was not made clear by those cases.23 
Undoubtedly, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vided an adequate remedy at law in matters where formerly 
there was no adequate legal remedy; and, of course, an inade-
quate legal remedy has always been a requirement for equity ju-
risdiction. The Supreme Court resolveg the unanswered ques-
tion in Ross v. Bernhard,2' in which it was established that the 
expanded historical test, that is, the Beacon Theatres/Dairy 
Queen nature of the issue test, is constitutionally required. 
rate trials, but courts struggled with this problem without 
clear guidelines. Some decisions rested on the "basic nature" 
of the case taken as a whole. In many other decisions this test 
was not recognized and the choice was left to the discretion of 
the trial judge. On occasion, attempts to apply the "basic na-
ture" test have led to inconsistent results. 
Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 488-89 (5th Cir. 
1961) (footnotes omitted). 
20. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
21. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
22. ld. at 472-73 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. at 510-11). 
Dairy Queen also made clear that "the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be 
made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings." Thus, a claim for a 
money judgment for breach of contract is not equitable solely because the claim is "cast 
in terms of an 'accounting' rather than in terms of an action for 'debt' or 'damages.' " ld. 
at 477-78. 
23. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966), where the Court referred to the 
Beacon Theatres/Dairy Queen holding as an "equitable doctrine." 
24. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
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Thus, "[t]he Seventh Amendment question depends on the na-
ture of the issue to be tried rather, than the character of the 
overall action. "211 
However, immediatoly after this apparent reaffirmation of 
the historical test, in its constitutionally required expanded ver-
sion, the Supreme Cour~ added a footnote which has been the 
source of much of the recent confusion regarding the scope of 
the seventh amendment. In this footnote the Supreme Court 
stated the following: 
As our cases in.dicate, the "legal" nature of an 
issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-
merger custom with reference to such questions; 
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practi-
cal abilities and limitations of juries. Of these 
factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly 
abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most 
difficult to apply.ss 
It is the third factor of this test which has led to much confusion 
recently, causing many federal courts to believe that the histori-
cal test has been abandoned. The third prong of this test has 
provided the basis for some federal courts to find that there is a 
"complexity exception" to the seventh amendment right to trial 
by jury; the first two prongs of the test traditionally being neces-
sary for seventh amendment analysis. 
Until Ross, with the possible exception of the equitable ac-
counting cases/~'1 the Supreme Court had never indicated that 
jury competence is a factor to be considered in determining a 
litigant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Ninth 
Circuit's rejection of tbis "suggestion of infidelity to the [histori-
25. [d. at 538 (footnote omitted). Thus, "where equitable and legal claims are joined 
in the same action, there is a light to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be 
infringed either by trYing the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court 
trial of a common issue existing between the claims." [d. at 537-38. 
It should be noted that Ross did not involve a situation in which the plaintiff had had 
an option previous to merger of proceeding at law or in equity. Ross dealt with the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative suit had a right to trial by jury 
on legal issues even though before merger such a plaintiff had to proceed in equity be-
cause the law courts did not recognize stockholder derivative suits. 
26. [d. at 538 n.lO. 
27. For a discussion of the equitable accounting cases, see text accompanying notes 
30-41 infra. 
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cal] test"28 will be discussed in the following section of this 
Note. 
·C. ANALYSIS 
Three alternative theories have been developed by those 
federal courts which have found a "complexity exception" to the 
seventh amendment right to trial by jury and were espoused by 
the defendants in aSF Litigation. The Ninth Circuit dismissed 
each of these theories as being unsound and held the traditional 
historical test applicable, stating that "where legal relief is 
sought and legal rights are asserted, ... the Seventh Amend-
ment preserves the right to jury trial."29 The following three 
subsections will analyze each of these theories and the Ninth 
Circuit's rationale for finding them inapplicable in aSF 
Litigation. 
Complex Cases-Analogous to an Action for an Equitable 
Accounting? 
The defendants in aSF Litigation argued that the complex-
ity of the litigation rendered it analogous to an action for an 
equitable accounting where historically there was no right to a 
jury trial.30 This argument actually purported not to be a claim 
28. Wolfram, supra note 14, at 643. 
29. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 423 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth 
Circuit summari2ed the type of relief sought and rights asserted in USF Litigation as 
follows: 
Id. 
The remedy which is sought in all of the consolidated cases is 
damages, which is the traditional form of relief granted by the 
common law courts. The substantive rights asserted are, in 
part, based on the common law principle of fraud and negli-
gence. The statutory rights under the securities laws . • • 
merely create new legal duties. 
30. In Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887), the jurisdiction of eq-
uity was sustained even though the matter was cogni2able at law on the ground that the 
ccmplexity of the accounts between the parties rendered the legal remedy inadequate. 
"The case made by the plaintiff is clearly one of which a court of equity may take cogni-
zance. The complicated nature of the accounts between the parties constitutes itself a 
sufficient ground for going into equity." Id. at 134. In Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 
495 (1831), the Court stated the rule that "in transactions [not involving certain fiduci-
ary relationships], great complexity ought to exist in the accounts, or some difficulty at 
law should interpose, some discovery should be required, in order to induce a court of 
chancery to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 503. Accord, H.B. Zachry Co. v. Terry, 195 F.2d 
185 (5th Cir. 1952); Quality Realty Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 50 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1931); 
Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928), af!'d on other 
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that there is an exception to the seventh amendment for com-
plex cases but instead was based upon the doctrine that tradi-
tional equity powers permit equity jurisdiction when the remedy 
at law is inadequate. The underlying rationale of defendant's at-
tempt to analogize USF' Litigation to the historical action for an 
equitable accounting is that when the so-called complexity of a 
case is such as to render it beyond the practical abilities and 
limitations of a jury, the remedy at law is inadequate and thus 
the case should be cognizable in equity. Thus, under this argu-
ment, the Ross test81 in purported not to be a new test for the 
seventh amendment but simply a "restatement of . . . tradi-
tional equity powers."a:1 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the USF Litigation defendants' 
attempted analogy in a very cursory fashion, simply stating that 
the argument 
attempts to have the legal or equitable nature of 
the case characterized as a whole rather than by 
examining the nature of the issues involved. . . . 
the issues presented here are of a legal nature. 
The fact that :resolution of the issues will involve 
an examination of USF's accounts, and account-
ing procedures, cannot transform the case into an 
action for an tlquitable accounting.33 
Although USF Litigation did not involve actions for an 
equitable accounting, the Ninth Circuit declined to deal specm-
grounds, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931). See also Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505 
(1889); Standard Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line RR Co., 13 F.2d 633 (W.D. Ky. 1926), 
aff'd on other grounds, 275 U.S. 257 (1927). 
31. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
32. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.RD. 59, 66-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In 
adopting this view of the third prong of the Ross test the Bernstein court stated that 
where the "remedy sought" necessarily involves determination 
of complexities that "only a court of equity can satisfactorily 
unravel," the "practical abilities and limitations of juries" are 
also necessarily involved and must be considered in evaluating 
the right to a juroJ trial. The adequacy of the legal remedy nec-
essarily involves the jury and its competency to find the facts. 
Id. at 66. This view was adopted by the district court in USF Litigation. See In re U.S. 
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.RD. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (per Turrentine, D.J.), rev'd, 609 
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (Killdnney, J., dissenting, based on the views expressed in the 
district court opinion). Accord, n..C Peripherals v. International Business Machs., 458 F. 
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
33. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 423 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980). 
54
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/6
1981J CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135 
cally with the distinguishing factors. Thus, a conclusion as to 
whether the Ninth Circuit was ultimately correct in rejecting the 
defendants' attempt to analogize USF Litigation to an action 
for an equitable accounting requires a brief discussion of the na-
ture and present status of the equitable accounting cases, as well 
as the rationale for historically permitting equity to try those 
cases. 
Historically, a plaintiff had the option of bringing "com-
plex" cases for an accounting in equity or at law even though the 
claims underlying the demand for an accounting were strictly le-
gaP' It is crucial to realize why the "complex" accounting cases 
were permitted to be brought in equity if the plaintiff so chose. 
Recourse to equity was not based upon a notion that they were 
too difficult for juries.S!) Rather, "the whole machinery of Courts 
of Equity [was] better adapted to the purpose of an account."S8 
Blackstone went even further, stating that the existence of law 
and equity's concurrent jurisdiction in the accounting cases was 
solely due to equity's power to order discovery. S7 At any rate, the 
fact that the accounting cases could be brought in equity did not 
imply that jury incompetence was the reason for permitting the 
34. In some cases the plaintiff had to proceed at law, there being no equity jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831) (lessor's action for an 
accounting of rent allegedly due had to be brought at law). When the underlying claims 
were equitable, equity jurisdiction was exclusive. See, e.g., Newberry v. Wilkinson, 199 F. 
673 (9th Cir. 1912) (suit for accounting against administratrix of a decedent's estate); 
Miller v. Weiant, 42 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (action to compel directors to account 
for corporate assets); Williams v. Collier, 38 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (suit by trustee 
in bankruptcy to void fraudulent transfer and impose a constructive trust). 
The third group of cases afforded plaintiff the option of whether to proceed at law or 
in equity, even though the underlying claims were legal in nature. Plaintiff's ability to 
proceed in equity was based upon the complexity of the accounts between the parties. 
See, e.g., Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887); Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831); H.B. Zachry Co. v. Terry, 195 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1952); McNair 
v. Burt, 68 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1934); Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 
891 (D. Kan. 1928), aff'd on other grounds, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931). 
35. In the common law action of account the jury did not perform the actual ac-
counting function. The jury would render a verdict that the defendant was obligated to 
account, at which point a court appointed auditor would settle the accounts between the 
parties. The jury would simply resolve disputed issues of fact arising before the auditor. 
Similarly, when equity took jurisdiction, a master would be appointed to perform the 
accounting function. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); 2 J. STORY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 587, 590 at 5, 6 & 8 (14 ed. 1918). 
36. 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 591 at 9 (14 ed. 1918). 
37. "But, for want of this discovery at law, the courts of equity have acquired a 
concurrent jurisdiction with every court in all matters of account." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 437 (1768). 
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choice. 
At no time in history was the line dividing equity 
from law altogether-or even largely-the prod-
uct of a rational choice between issues which were 
better suited to court or to jury trial . . . . jury 
trial (or court trial) was often merely the tail of 
the dog under a system where you had to take the 
whole dog.sS 
Since the merger of law and equity, the procedural barriers 
characteristic of the premerger law courts have been eliminated. 
It would seem that this should have eliminated the option of a 
plaintiff to proceed in equity or at law in the equitable account-
ing cases. However, in dictum, the Supreme Court suggested· in 
Dairy Queen that the plaintiff may still have the option of 
bringing complex accounting cases in equity although with con-
siderably more difficulty than before the law-equity merger; jury 
competency being the relevant factor in determining whether an 
accounting case is cognizable in equity.89 The question of 
whether this option still exists does not appear to have been re-
solved by any court since the merger. The reason for this is 
probably based on the fact that federal courts favor the policy of 
giving either party a jury trial l,lpon demand when the case 
presents issues so triable.-4O 
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the defendants' attempt to analogize USF Litigation to the old 
equitable accounting cases was misplaced because it attempted 
to characterize the US]~ cases as a whole rather than character-
38. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 661-62 (1963) 
(footnotes omitted). 
39. [I)n order to maintain such a suit on a cause of action cogniza-
ble at law .•. the plaintiff must be able to show that the "ac-
counts between the parties" are of such a "complicated na-
ture" that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel 
them. 
In view of the powers given to District Courts by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 53(b) to appoint masters to assist the jury 
in these exceptional cases where the legal issues are too com-
plicated for the jury adequately to handle alone, the burden of 
such a showing is considerably increased and it will indeed be 
a rare case in which it can be met. 
369 U.S. at 478 (footnotes omitted). 
40. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.7, at 377 (1977). See, e.g., Simler v. 
Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). 
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ize each issue. There is no doubt that the Beacon Theatres/ 
Dairy Queen holding stated the general rule that the character 
of the issue and not the overall action is what controls. The 
Ninth Circuit declined, however, to deal specifically with the 
fact that the accounting cases were cognizable in equity based 
upon the "complexity" of the overall case. 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the factors 
which distinguished USF Litigation from the historic equitable 
accounting cases, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the analogy 
was unsound was correct for several reasons. First, given the 
present uncertainty of a plaintiff's ability to bring an action for 
an equitable accounting when the underlying claims are legal, 
the Ninth Circuit was warranted on this basis alone in not find-
ing the equitable accounting case analogous, as USF Litigation 
did not involve an action for an accounting; and even the Dairy 
Queen dictum only referred to accounting cases. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, even if the accounting cases could be 
found to parallel USF Litigation, it is still clear that the plain-
tiffs in USF Litigation would have been entitled to the jury trial 
they demanded as the plaintiff in the old equitable accounting 
cases had the option of having trial by jury. 
The final question to be resolved under the defendants' first 
argument is whether "complexity" is a basis for equity jurisdic-
tion in non-accounting cases where legal rights are' asserted and 
legal remedies sought. The answer is no.41 "[M]ere complication 
41. In United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906), the United States 
sought relief in equity for the alleged removal and sale of a large amount of timber by 
means of an intricate conspiracy. The United States invoked equity jurisdiction because 
"by reason of the frauds and conspiracies. . • and the complications which have resulted 
therefrom, no plain, adequate, and complete remedy can be given .•. at law ...• " ld. 
at 462. However, the Court held that the case was not cognizable in equity: 
The principal ground upon which it is claimed that the rem-
edy at law is inadequate is really nothing more than a diffi-
culty in proving the case against the defendants. The bill 
shows that whatever was done in the way of cutting the timber 
and carrying it away was done by the defendants as tort 
feasors and the various devices alleged to have been resorted 
to by the deceased, Daly, by way of organizing different corpo-
rations, in order to, as alleged, cover up his tracks, and to 
render it more difficult for the complainant to make proof of 
his action, does not in the least tend to give a court of equity 
jurisdiction on that account. It is simply a question of evi-
dence to show who did the wrong and upon that point the fact 
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of facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity 
jurisidiction. "42 
Thus, the defendants' contention that USF Litigation was 
analogous to the old E~quitable accounting cases was without 
merit. Had the Ninth Circuit accepted this argument, it would 
have been tantamount to finding that there is a "complexity ex-
ception" to the seventh amendment. Non-accounting cases 
which present legal issues and legal remedies are simply not tri-
able in equity based upon the notion that there is no adequate 
remedy at law. 
Ross v. Bernhard-A Functional Interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment? 
The second argument offered by the defendants in USF Lit-
igation as a basis for filtlding that there is no right to a jury trial 
in complex cases was specifically based upon the Ross footnote.4s 
Under this approach, Ross was claimed to establish a new func-
tional test for when a litigant has a constitutional right to a jury 
trial. Thus, defendants claimed that the historical test has been 
abandoned in favor of a new test whereby the practical abilities 
and limitations of a jury are an additional factor to be consid-
ered in seventh amendment analysis.44 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that Ross established 
a new standard governing seventh amendment analysis, and 
gave several reasons why Ross should not be so construed. First, 
the Ninth Circuit stated that the Ross test was -only dictum and 
thus not binding on federal courts. Undoubtedly, this assess-
ment of the Ross test was correct. The Supreme Court did not 
even consider the practical abilities and limitations of jurors in 
reaching a decision in the Ross case itself. That is, the Supreme 
Court did not apply the third prong of this purported new test 
could be ascertained as readily at law as in equity. 
Id. at 472-73. 
42. Curriden v Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914), alf'g, United States v. Bitter 
Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906). 
43. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
44. This view of the Ross test was adopted in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 
420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976), in which the Court was "of the opinion that the 
third part to footnote 10 in Ross v. Bernhard is of constitutional dimensions. It must be 
seen as a limitation to or interpretation of the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 105 (citation 
omitted). 
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in its analysis of the seventh amendment question in Ross.45 
Secondly, as the Ninth Circuit stated, the Supreme Court 
would certainly not attempt to change the standard for constitu~ 
tional analysis in a footnote. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
the historical test, having been applied throughout almost the 
entire history of the seventh amendment, would hardly be dis-
carded without some type of reasoned analysis or cited authority 
supporting a new functional interpretation of the seventh 
amendment. There was neither in the Ross opinion.46 
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly construed Ross as not 
intending an alteration of the seventh amendment right to trial 
by jury, the court incorrectly assessed the variance between the 
historical test and the purported new Ross test. The Ninth Cir- . 
cuit stated that application of the Ross test "would necessitate 
an examination of the whole case. "47 The Ninth Circuit believed 
that under the Ross test the whole case would have to be charac-
terized as legal or equitable and thus application of the Ross test 
would be inconsistent with prior seventh amendment analysis 
which has always been based on the nature of the issue to be 
tried.48 
However, application of the Ross test would not require a 
characterization of the overall case and, indeed, Ross prohibited 
such a characterization. Had Ross actually stated a new consti-
45. In Ross the question of jury competence was raised at every level. The district 
court had found that the jury was competent to deal with the issues. The appellate court 
questioned the jury's ability to resolve derivative suits "because of the exceedingly com-
plex nature of many of these actions" but then stated that "the Seventh Amendment 
does not ask that we assess the suitability of a given type of litigation for jury trial." See 
Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 403 
F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). However, the 
Supreme Court considered the claims asserted in Ross and found them to be "legal" 
without any mention of a jury's abilities to understand the issues. Implicit in this failure 
to consider the jury's competence in dealing with the complex issues presented by the 
Ross litigation was that the Supreme Court did not intend that jury competency be a 
factor in dealing with seventh amendment questions. 
46. "[T]he footnote is so cursory, conclusory and devoid of cited authority or rea-
soned analysis that it is difficult to believe it could have been intended to reject such 
established historical practice or Supreme Court precedent." Redish, Seventh Amend-
ment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision-Making, 70 
Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 526 (1975). 
47. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 426 (9th Cir. 1979). 
48.Id. 
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tutional standard governing seventh amendment questions, that 
standard would still have required that each issue be evaluated 
in terms of the three factors comprising the Ross test. The sen-
tence explained by the footnote stated that "[t]he Seventh 
Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be 
tried rather than the character of the overall action."49 Thus, the 
question would be whether a given issue, otherwise legal, is be-
yond the practical abilities and limitations of a jury. 
Although the Ross test is consistent with the historical test 
insofar as characterization is to be based upon the nature of the 
issue, there are major problems inherent in its application. The 
Ross Court gave no guidance as to whether the test is to be ap-
plied on a case by case basis or whether it is to be applied on a 
generic basis. Application on a case by case basis would require a 
court to characterize an issue as being beyond the jury's capabil-
ities in each case. AplPlication on a generic basis would require 
that a certain type of issue be generally characterized as beyond 
the capabilities of a jury. 
Application of either method of characterizing an issue im-
mediately leads to the problem of ascertaining the proper stan-
dards to be applied. VVhen is an issue beyond the practical abili-
ties and limitations of a jury? Characterization on a case by case 
basis would force courts to speculate before trial as to whether 
an issue is going to be too complex for jury resolution. This 
would lead to a great deal of inconsistency from case to case. A 
right guaranteed by the Constitution should not "be dependent 
upon the exercise of such a broad discretionary power by federal 
court judges.lSo Indeec:il, one of the major purposes of the seventh 
amendment was to protect litigants from such an arbitrary exer-
cise of power by federal court judges.lSl Much the same problem 
exists with a generic approach to characterizing an issue. Again, 
the problem lies in a'3certaining what standard is to be applied. 
For example, are antitrust claims generally too complex for reso-
49. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970). 
50. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 644 (the Ross test raises "the spectre of federal 
judges using a disturbingly broad discretion in their determination of whether a jury 
ought to be interposed in particular cases."). 
51. For an excellent discussion of the seventh amendment's historical background, 
see Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
639 (1973). 
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lution by a jury whereas tax claims are not? Where is the line to 
be drawn? The Supreme Court has never addressed, let alone 
resolved, any of these problems iriherent in an attempt to apply 
the purported new Ross test governing seventh amendment 
analysis. . 
Finally, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the Supreme Court 
has addressed seventh amendment questions in depth on five oc-
casions since the Ross decision. Each case was decided on the 
basis of the traditional historical test. 1S2 In none of these cases 
was there any mention of the Ross test or jury competence as 
being relevant in resolving the seventh amendment questions 
presented. Had the Supreme Court intended the Ross test to be 
of "constitutional dimensions" it most certainly would have ap-
plied the test in these later cases and perhaps resolved some of 
the problems inherent in any attempt to apply it. 
It is not clear what the Supreme Court meant by the inclu-
sion of the controversial footnote in the Ross opinion. However, 
the Ninth Circuit was justified in concluding that the Supreme 
Court did not intend that it be a new functional interpretation 
of the seventh amendment whereby there is some sort of com-
plexity exception to the right to trial by jury. 
Jury Trial-A Violation of Due Process in Complex Cases? 
The final argument proffered by the defendants was based 
upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The defen-
dants claimed that because of the complexity of USF Litigation, 
a jury could not make a rational decision and thus due process 
would be violated by permitting an incompetent fact-finder to 
render an irrational verdict. ISS The Ninth Circuit rejected this ar-
52. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.s. 189, 194 (1974) ("[t]he Seventh Amendment •.• 
requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, en-
forceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."); Pernell v. Southall 
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974) (seventh amendment "requires trial by jury in ac-
tions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies 
of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action in equity or 
admiralty."). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (historical test 
applied without any mention of abilities of juries or the Ross dictum); Lorillard v. Pons, 
434 U.S. 575 (1978) (holding based on statutory grounds), af/'g 416 U.S. 363; Atlas Roof-
ing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 449 af/'g 416 U.S. 363 (1977). 
53. The court in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 
1976), adopted this view as an alternative basis for striking the jury demands in that 
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gument, simply stating that a jury is not incompetent to decide 
complex cases. The Ninth Circuit refused to "accept the under-
lying premise of [defendants'] argument, 'that a single judge is 
bright~r than the jurors collectively functioning together.' "54 
Furthermore, "[ w ]hetb.er a case is tried to a jury or to a judge, 
the taSk of the attorney remains the same. The attorney must 
organize and assemblH a complex mass of information into a 
form which is understandable to the uninitiated."IHI 
Cases-As Complex as They First Appear? 
Although not the basis of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of 
the defendants' due process argument, the Ninth Circuit dis-
cussed the many pretrial occurrences and procedural mecha-
nisms by which cases, originally appearing overwhelmingly com-
plicated, are simplified before they ever reach the jury. 
A motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 may be used to 
test the sufficiency of an adversary's pleadings. 
The facts may become sufficiently clear on some 
issues to entitle a party to have judgment entered 
as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The 
parties may stipulate to the admissibility of evi-
dence, or to the facts themselves, thus reducing 
the time necessary to present a case at trial. The 
trial court could also order separate trials on some 
of the claims or issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). 
And, . . . many cases or issues may be settled 
prior to trial. &6 
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) empowers a 
case. The Boise court stated that trial by court was necessary "for the appearance and 
fact of fairness." Id. at 105. 
54. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting 
Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial 
Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 53 (1977». 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that had it been necessary to resolve the question of 
jury competency under the fust two arguments propounded by the defendants, the court 
would have resolved the question the same way it did under defendants' due process 
claim. Implicit in this is that the Ninth Circuit would refuse to uphold the former option 
of a plaintiff to bring an action for an equitable accounting when the underlying claims 
are legal in nature. Furthermore, had the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Ross test was 
intended to be of constitutional dimension, the Ninth Circuit would simply have held 
that no case (or issue) is too complex for jury resolution, and would in effect continue to 
adhere to the traditional historical test. 
55. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 428 (9th Cir. 1979). 
56. Id. at 428 (footnotel1 omitted). 
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judge to appoint a master to assist the jury with complicated 
issues,5'7 and Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits the use of 
summaries of voluminous material in order to simplify the evi-
dence presented at trial. 58 
Although the Ninth Circuit discussed all these considera-
tions by which complex cases may be simplified for jury resolu-
tion, they were not the basis for the Ninth Circuit's rejection of 
the defendants' due process argument in USF Litigation, be-
cause the Ninth Circuit ruled "that the Seventh Amendment re-
quires a jury trial in even the most complex cases at law 
"59 
The defendants' due process argument was rejected by the 
Ninth Circuit on the ground that "a jury is a competent fact-
finder in complex cases."60 Thus, there is no due process excep-
tion to the seventh amendment. The Ninth Circuit did "not be-
lieve any case is so overwhelmingly complex that it is beyond the 
abilities of a jury."61 "Jurors, if properly instructed and treated 
with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and 
dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled in other areas 
of public service. "62 
To a large extent, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the due 
process contention was based upon the Court's own confidence 
in the jury system. The Ninth Circuit ackowledged, there has 
been little substantive research conducted dealing with the prac-
tical abilities of jurors.68 
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b), construed in In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 
at 428. 
58. FED. R. Evm. 1006, construed in In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d at 
428. 
Furthermore, the Manual for Complex Litigation, developed by the Federal Judicial 
Center, providea various 8uggestions as to how the federal district court judge can man-
age and direct complex litigation. The Manual specifie8 that the trial judge must not 
infringe a litigant'8 right to trial by jury. "Caution: Make 8ure that the requirements for 
jury trial enunciated in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, or Ross v. Bernhard, are not 
violated in ordering trial of a separate issue." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION 139-40 (1977). 
59. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 428 n.58 (9th Cir. 1979). 
60. Id. at 427. 
61. Id. at 432. 
62. Id. at 430. 
63. [d. 
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However, in the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in USF Litiga-
tion, the court did note the procedural devices available to the 
federal courts which, in effect, render the due process claim 
without foundation.64 In any trial where a verdict has been re-
turned against the w«~ight of the evidence, where damages are 
unreasonably high, or where the trial was unfair for some reason, 
the trial judge has the power under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 59 to grant a new trial.61i Also, a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 50 where there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict.66 These procedural safeguards protect litigants from the 
possibility of an "irrational verdict" in any trial. 
In view of the fact that the jury system has been part of 
American jurisprudence for its entire history, it would certainly 
be highly questionable for the Ninth Circuit to suddenly assert 
that trial by jury may violate a litigant's right to due process of 
law, particularly in light of the fact that a litigant who does de-
mand trial by jury is guaranteed the right by the seventh 
amendment. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was completely justified in 
concluding that the fifth amendment due process' clause does 
not provide a "complexity exception" to the seventh amendment 
right to trial by jury. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was clearly war-
ranted in rejecting the defendants' effort to deny the plaintiffs 
their seventh amendment right to trial by jury. Adoption of any 
one of the three theories advanced by the defendants would 
have had the effect of establishing some sort of "complexity ex-
ception" to the seventh amendment guarantee. Adoption of any 
one of the three theories would require trial judges to make a 
speculative and discretionary decision as to when a case is going 
to be "beyond the practical abilities and limitations of juries" 
and, as a result, whell a litigant has a constitutional right to trial 
by jury. A constitutional right should not be relegated to such a 
64. Id. at 432. 
65. Id. (construing FED. R. ClY. P. 59). 
66. Id. (construing FED. R. ClY. P. 50); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (judgment n.o.v. may be granted when "the evidence permits only one reason-
able conclusion as to the verdict."). 
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position in light of contrary Supreme Court precedent and the 
fact that the seventh amendment was intended to protect liti-
gants from just that type of discretionary power in the hands of 
federal court judges. 
Curtis E. Blystone* 
v. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
In Zaslowsky v. Board of Education, 610 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 
Dec., 1979), public schoolteachers alleged that a desegregation 
plan requiring that the racial and ethnic makeup of teachers at 
each school in the district reflect the racial and ethnic makeup 
of teachers in the district as a whole violated their equal protec-
tion rights. The plan was instituted as a result of notification 
from the Office of Civil Rights that a previously instituted plan 
did not comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The plan called for the involuntary transfer of several hundred 
teachers. Plaintiffs based their equal protection argument on the 
fact that the plan took race into accou,nt. () 
Relying on United States v. Montgomery County Board of 
Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969) and its progeny, the court ruled 
that in assigning teachers, a school district need not be "color 
blind." The court also stated that race-conscious plans are valid 
even in the absence of de jure segregation. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265, 352 (1978); United 
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); McDaniel v. 
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). The court also noted the Supreme 
Court's approval of the adoption of prescribed ratios by a school 
board in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
In Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 612 F.2d 411 
(9th Cir. Nov., 1979), plaintiffs alleged that the school district 
maintained racially imbalanced schools. The district court found 
that the schools were indeed segregated as a result of the dis-
tri<;:t's acts, but that the school district did not act with "segre-
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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gative intent," because it had followed a race neutral "neighbor-
hood school policy." The district court held that a strict 
adherence to such a policy was sufficient to dispell inferences of 
segregative intent that arose from plaintiffs' evidence. 
The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of even the strictest 
adherence to a neighborhood policy is not determinative of the 
absence of a forbidden purpose. The court pointed out that 
under such a policy of building schools in a racially segregated 
neighborhood could be motivated by a discriminatory intent. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U.S. 1, 20-21. The court remanded the case for further factual 
determinations. 
In United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. April, 
1980), defendants argued that state statutes prohibiting carnal 
knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen years violated 
equal protection guarlmtees in that it established an impermissi-
ble gender based classification. Under the statute, only male 
participants were punishable. Although admitting that the stat-
ute classified according to gender, the government argued that 
only males could be perpetrators, and only females victims, of 
the crime of carnal knowledge. 
Relying on Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the court of 
appeals held that in order to survive attack, a statute which 
classifies according to gender must serve an imporant govern-
mental purpose and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of that purpose. The government asserted that the 
statute furthered the goals of preventing teenage pregnancies 
and injuries to young women. The government's only evidence 
on the relationship between the purpose and the penalties were 
the assertions that "only women could get pregnant," and that 
"there seems to be evidence that women are far more likely to 
suffer physical damage" than men of the same age. The govern-
ment produced no evidence that suggested punishing only males 
furthered either purpose. 
The court held that by failing to produce any such evidence, 
the government failed to meet its burden of proving a substan-
tial relation between the stated goals and the gender based as-
signment of the roles of "victim" and "perpetrator." 
In Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. April, 1980), the 
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii's mental 
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heath laws. Plaintiff argued that a statute which allows for the 
involuntary commitment of a person who is "mentally ill . . . 
and is dangerous to property" but not necessarily to himself or 
other persons was an unconstitutional curtailment of civilliber-
ties. Noting that the statute allowed commitment of any person 
"inflicting, attempting or threatening imminently to inflict dam-
age to any property," the court of appeals agreed. The court 
cited Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) for the rule 
that a state may not involuntarily commit a person unless the 
potential of that person doing harm to himself or others justifies 
such a curtailment of liberty. The court also cited Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) for the rule that the individual's lib-
erty interest must be heavily weighed against society's interest 
to determine if a commitment statute is valid. The court hy-
pothesized that under Hawaii's statute, a person could be invol-
untarily committed for threatening to shoot a neighbor'S dog 
that had strayed on his property. The court held that society's 
interest in' protecting any property did not outweigh the individ-
ual's liberty interest. 
Hawaii's statute also permitted involuntary commitment for 
a "diagnostic examination and evaluation" of a person who ref-
uses to submit to such an examination by a 'physician and "there 
is sufficient evidence to believe that the allegations of the [com-
mitment] petition are true." The district court held this provi-
sion violated the patient's fifth amendment right to remain si-
lent. Finding that the statute imposed incarceration because the 
patient is dangerous, and not as punishment for refusing to talk, 
and noting that evidence that the patient is dangerous is also 
required by the statute, the court held that this portion of the 
statute was valid under the Constitution. The court relied on 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), which upheld a 
prison disciplinary procedure whereby a prisoner's refusal to 
speak could be used as evidence against him because under the 
regulation such a refusal, standing alone, was not sufficient evi-
dence to penalize the prisoner. The court also stated that if the 
district court's decision were upheld, any subject of a commit-
ment petition could avoid commitment simply by remaining 
silent. 
The court of appeals also considered the constitutionality of 
a state statute which allowed involuntary commitment of a per-
son who is "dangerous" but did not require the danger to be 
, imminent or substantial, The court struck down this portion of 
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the statute as a violation of the holding in Lessard v. Schmidt, 
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.n. Wis. 1972), vacated and re-
manded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on 
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.n. Wis.), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on re-
mand, 413 F. Supp. 1818 (E.n. Wis. 1976), "[t]hat the proper 
standard is that which requires a finding of im'minent and sub-
stantial danger as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or 
threat." 438 F. Supp. at 1110. 
The court of appElals also reversed the district court holding 
that the need for the five day evaluation confinement be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on Addington 
which rejected the argument that the need for civil commitment 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and held that the proof 
must ~e greater than that required in other types of civil suits. 
In Clark v. Chasen, 619 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. May, 1980), 
plaintiff, a female employee of the United States CuStoms Ser-
vice, filed a formal complaint with the Customs Service alleging 
that she was treated differently than the man who had previ-
ously held her position. She later left the Service and filed a dis-
ability claim based on an inability to continue working. The Ser-
vice informed plaintiJ!f that it had tentatively found that her 
employment discrimination charge was unfounded, and that she 
had a right to a hearing at which she could be represented by 
counsel. Immediately prior to the scheduled hearing, the plain-
tiff requested a continuance. This request was denied. Plaintiff 
thereafter refused to take part in the hearing, and her complaint 
was cancelled for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff then brought suit 
in federal district COUlrt. This action was dismissed for failure to 
exhaust administrativ·e remedies. 
The court examined the legislative history of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 (the Act) and discovered that 
the Act was passed in an attempt to correct what Congress per-
ceived as an "abysmal record in [governmental] minority em-
ployment," and past failures to deal administratively with dis-
crimination claims by federal employees. The court found that 
Congress wished to change the practice of giving each federal 
agency the power to police its own employment practices. 
Citing Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976), the 
court noted that the Act provided for a trial de novo in federal 
court for those who had employment discrimination complaints 0 
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arising in private employment. The Clark panel held that there 
was no reason why federal employees should be more heavily 
burdened than private employees in bringing discrimination 
suits, and cited Grubbs. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
which held that the legislative intent would be frustrated by re-
quiring federal employees, but not private employees, to exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing suit under the Act. The 
court therefore reversed the district court, and remanded for a 
trial de novo in the district court, noting that the administrative 
record could be admitted as evidence at the new trial. 
In In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. June, 
1980), the court considered whether the rule in California that 
punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions vi-
olates the equal protection clause. The case arose out of an air-
plane crash. Several of the wrongful death actions brought 
against the airline company included claims for punitive dam-
ages. The wrongful death actions were consolidated and trans-
ferred to the federal district court in California, and it was de-
termined that California law would apply. The district court 
held that although California courts of appeal have held that pu-
nitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions under 
California law, such a rule violates equal protection guarantees 
of both the state and federal constitutions because it establishes 
an improper distinction between plaintiffs in wrongful death 
suits and those bringing other tort actions. Defendants appealed, 
and the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
The court first considered whether the California rule vio-
lates the federal equal protection clause. Relying on Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), 
and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), the 
court of appeals held that the relationship between the govern-
mental purpose of limiting liability and the class established by 
the California rule was rational, and that under the Constitution 
no greater relationship was required. The court specifically re-
fused to apply a middle-tier analysis. 
In rejecting plaintiff's claim that the California rule violated 
the California Constitution, the court distinguished Cooper v. 
Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978), 
and Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
388 (1975), on the ground that those cases denied a large class of 
people any recovery whatsoever. The court pointed out that 
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under the California rule, substantial compensatory damages 
were available in wrongful death cases. 
The court also rejected the district court's holding that a 
state rule which allows punitive damages for injuries to property 
while disallowing such damages under the state constitution be-
cause the "classification ... advance[s] a discernible purpose in 
a rational manner." 
In California Medical Association v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. May, 1980) (en banc), the court 
considered the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-442,451-455 (1976) 
(amended 1976 & 1980) (the Act). Plaintiffs, the California Med-
ical Association and its political committee affiliate, argued that 
the Act's limitations on contributions by the medical association 
to its affiliate was an infringement on their first amendment 
rights to speech and political expression. Plaintiffs also argued 
that the requirement that support given by the medical associa-
tion to a multicandidate political committee must be counted to-
ward the dollar limit on such contributions, even though contri-
butions by labor unions and corporations were not so limited, 
was unconstitutional. The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' 
claims. 
The court found the limitations imposed by the Act on the 
right of association minimal. The court pointed out that the Act 
did not limit in any way the medical association's right to collect 
and expend money or efforts to elect any particular candidate. 
The Act does not limit efforts to directly influence others to vote 
for particular candidates, but only limits the amounts that can 
be given to a multicandidate political committee. The court re-
lied on Buckley v. ,raleo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and 
First National Banh v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), for the 
proposition that restrictions on contributions to multicandidate 
committees were consistent with the Constitution. The court 
noted that contributions to such committees constitute "poten-
tial speech dependent upon the recipient for its ultimate articu-
lation," and limitations on such "potential speech" do not "sig-
nificantly diminish the effectiveness or the quantity of political 
speech." The court stated that because the intrusion by the Act 
on the right to political speech was slight, only the absence of a 
"discernible, important, and legitimate policy of the Congress" 
could result in a finding of unconstitutionality. See Buckley. 
70
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/6
1981] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the Califor-
nia Medical Association was more limited in their right to politi-
cal expression than were corporations and labor unions, pointing 
out that corporations and labor unions are flatly prohibited from 
directly spending money to influence federal elections. 
Dissenting, Judges Choy and Hug argued that the Act was 
unconstitutional as to its treatment of unincorporated associ-
ations. 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Wallace stated that 
the restriction on contributions to a campaign committee were 
sustainable under the first amendment only if 1) the govern-
ment's interest were greater than the group and individual inter-
ests in freedom of speech and association, and 2) the restriction 
and unincorporated associations but not labor unions and corpo-
rations were "closely tailored" to achieve a stated governmental 
interest. Judge Wallace would have held that the Act places "di-
rect and substantial restraints on the quantity" of the associa-
tions "political speech" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 
39), and that substantial and impermissable restraints were 
placed on the association member's. freedom of association. 
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